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I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate personhood defines corporations as something they cannot
be.1  It characterizes corporations as persons even though they have no 
bodies, souls, or hearts.2  The legal fiction of corporate personhood,
though useful, foments conceptual confusion and normative quagmires. 
As “artificial” persons, corporations can claim the constitutional rights of 
natural persons.3  But then they can turn around and evade the obligations
1. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of 
Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . . . the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’
include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint
stock companies, as well as individuals.”).  This statute is often referred to as the 
Dictionary Act or Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431.  Many state statutes 
provide for similar definitions.  See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11022 (West
2007) (“‘Person’ means individual, corporation, government or governmental 
subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company,
or association, or any other legal entity.”).
2. These inherent differences acquire relevance in many contexts.  For example, 
without a body, corporations cannot be incarcerated for wrongdoing.  Similarly, without 
a body there can be no “tag” jurisdiction over corporations.  Actual persons have no 
subsidiaries, corporations have no “home,” individuals cannot be and act in multiple
places at the same time, and it makes little sense to test where the “nerve center” of a
natural person lies.  Cf. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 
2846, 2851 (2011) (holding that the test for general jurisdiction probes whether the 
contacts of the corporation with the forum state are enough so that the defendant 
corporation is “essentially at home” in the forum); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 
1181, 1186 (2010) (noting that a corporation’s “nerve center” for diversity jurisdiction
purposes will typically, though not always, be found at its corporate headquarters); Lea 
Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal Relations:
Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1986) (explaining how
the United States could have jurisdiction over a foreign subsidiary if that subsidiary’s
parent is incorporated in the United States).
3. This includes political speech rights, commercial speech rights, negative
speech rights, protection against unreasonable searches, the right to invoke the Due 
Process Clause, the protections afforded by the Takings Clause and the Double Jeopardy
Clause, and protection of corporate racial and tribal identities.  See, e.g., Citizens United 
v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (holding that bans on political speech based on the
speaker’s corporate identity are prima facie violations of the First Amendment); Am.
Tradition P’ship v. Bullock,132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (reaching a per curiam decision 
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that come with personhood.4  This Article argues that this discrepancy 
constitutes a fundamental and dangerous mismatch.  Rights must track
obligations. 
The most central political obligation a person—artificial or natural— 
can have is the duty to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts.  Without
jurisdiction, a forum cannot enforce any substantive obligations.
Jurisdiction is the lynchpin for enforcing obligations, for adjudicating 
and deterring corporate wrongdoing, and for the vibrancy of any regulatory
regime.  It is thus unacceptable that corporations increasingly have the
rights and means to exert political influence in a forum but simultaneously 
retain the conceptual tools to evade the reach of the forum’s courts. 
Corporate personhood is a place where courts have split rights and
obligations asunder to dangerous effect. 
Nowhere is this divorce more visible, consequential, and its effect 
more painful than in the personal jurisdiction doctrine.5  Courts and
scholars have overlooked that the expansion of corporate rights entails 
the expansion of corporate obligations, including the obligation to submit to
the jurisdiction of the right-granting forum.6  Lacking the conceptual 
spend freely to advocate for or against candidates for local and state offices); see also
infra notes 67–108 and accompanying text. 
4. Most central is the obligation to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts.  See, 
e.g., Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1705 (2012) (“[T]he term ‘individual’ as
used in the [Torture Victim Protection] Act encompasses only natural persons.”); AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (demonstrating the use of 
binding arbitration to avoid jurisdiction); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 
2869, 2888 (2010) (limiting the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws); Aguinda v.
Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537–38, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting corporate 
defendant dismissal based on forum non conveniens grounds in a boomerang litigation), 
aff’d, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002). 
5. As the names of the most famous personal jurisdiction cases make clear, personal
jurisdiction doctrine now develops mostly with reference to corporations.  Consider the 
names of the landmark post-Pennoyer cases: International Shoe, Asahi Metal Industry, 
World-Wide Volkswagen, Helicopteros Nacionales, Burger King, Carnival Cruise Lines, et
cetera.  More recently, the Supreme Court developed the personal jurisdiction doctrine in
J. McIntyre Machinery and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations. 
6. Predictably, personal jurisdiction doctrine is in disarray, with courts and 
scholars struggling to articulate a coherent framework for answering when defendants 
are obligated to submit to the jurisdiction of a state. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, J.
McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1246 (2011) [hereinafter Borchers, Incoherence] (“[T]he Court 
lacks any clear constitutional rationale for limiting state-court assertions of jurisdiction.”); 
Patrick J. Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism: International Shoe’s Half-Buried Legacy, 28
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 561, 564 (1995) (“[J]urisdiction in the United States is a mess.”); 
Robert C. Casad, Personal Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 
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vocabulary of obligations, courts and scholars have focused on justice 
instead.7  They ask whether imposition of jurisdiction would be just or 
1589 (1992) (noting that the Supreme Court has “not given us a coherent philosophical 
foundation for the constitutional restrictions they recognize”); Jay Conison, What Does
Due Process Have To Do with Jurisdiction?, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1071, 1076 (1994)
(“[Personal jurisdiction jurisprudence] is a body of law whose purpose is uncertain, 
whose rules and standards seem incapable of clarification, and whose connection to the
Constitution cannot easily be divined.”); Kevin C. McMunigal, Essay, Desert, Utility,
and Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J.
189, 189 (1998) (“Ambiguity and incoherence have plagued the minimum contacts
test . . . .”); Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 101, 101–02 (2010) (“In all the years since 1990, the Supreme Court has not 
returned to the subject of personal jurisdiction and has left the lower courts on their own 
to try to make sense of a doctrine without any clear foundation.”); Linda Silberman, 
Reflections on Burnham v. Superior Court: Toward Presumptive Rules of Jurisdiction
and Implications for Choice of Law, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 569, 572 n.17 (1991) (describing
the personal jurisdiction doctrine as marked by “uncertainty and confusion”); Allan R. 
Stein, Burnham and the Death of Theory in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 22
RUTGERS L.J. 597, 598 (1991) (opining that a state’s ability to assert jurisdiction over a 
defendant merely because he was served with process in that state “render[s] an already 
muddled area of the law totally incoherent”); Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common
Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 850 (1989) (“The Supreme
Court has . . . failed to expound a coherent theory of the limits of state sovereignty over
noncitizens or aliens.”); Mary Twitchell, Burnham and Constitutionally Permissible 
Levels of Harm, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 659, 666 (1991) (stating that the approach taken in
Burnham creates “jurisdictional stew”); Louise Weinberg, The Place of Trial and the 
Law Applied: Overhauling Constitutional Theory, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 67, 102 (1988)
(noting that personal jurisdiction doctrine is a “body of rules without reasons”); James 
Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for 
Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 171 (2004) (“Although the extensive body of
commentary on federally imposed limitations of state court jurisdiction agrees on very
little, the one point of consensus is that Supreme Court personal jurisdiction doctrine is 
deeply confused.”); Russell J. Weintraub, An Objective Basis for Rejecting Transient 
Jurisdiction, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 611, 625 (1991) (“Jurisdictional doctrine is in chaos.”). 
But cf. Richard K. Greenstein, The Nature of Legal Argument: The Personal Jurisdiction
Paradigm, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 855, 856 (1987) (“The doctrine of personal jurisdiction . . . 
is consistent and coherent.”).
7. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (emphasizing the 
importance of “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” for the personal 
jurisdiction analysis (emphasis added) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 
(1940)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882) 
(arguing that consent made the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the corporation
“eminently fit and just” (emphasis added)); Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350, 368–
69 (1873) (emphasizing the importance of personal jurisdiction because judgment
without proper notice and opportunity to be heard amounts to “judicial usurpation and 
oppression, and never can be upheld where justice is justly administered” (emphasis 
added)); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407 (1856) (“[P]rinciple of 
natural justice . . . forbids condemnation without opportunity for defence.” (emphasis 
added)); Kilburn v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37, 40 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) (“To bind a defendant 
personally by a judgment when he was never personally summoned, or had notice of the 
proceeding, would be contrary to the first principles of justice.” (emphasis added)).  In
modern times, notions of justice are subsumed under a due process analysis.  See, e.g., 
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convenient to the corporate defendant instead of asking whether the
corporation has an obligation to submit to the jurisdiction of the forum.8 
This Article aims to reconnect corporate rights and obligations.  It 
argues that courts must consider the availability and exercise of corporate 
rights when determining whether the corporation is amenable to suit in
the forum.
To make this novel argument, this Article begins by documenting the 
rise of corporate personhood, recently culminating in Citizens United v. 
FEC.9  Part II shows how the evolution of corporations now allows for 
the treatment of corporations as entities that can have political rights and
political obligations. 
Part III argues that personal jurisdiction doctrine and scholarship has 
not acknowledged the rise of corporate personhood.  Consequently, it has
unduly focused on aspects of justice and convenience while neglecting
notions of political obligations.  This Part asks courts and scholars 
to reconsider the impulses behind the personal jurisdiction’s minimum 
contacts factors currently in use.  It suggests that the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence will be improved through the incorporation of factors into 
the minimum contacts analysis that probe for the political obligations of 
the corporate defendant.10 
8. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) 
(“A court must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, 
and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief.”); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958) (“[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum 
State . . . .”); Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (examining an “estimate of the inconveniences” 
to the defendant from trial in the forum (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 
F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (determining that considering 
the “interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 
controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental 
substantive social policies” helps protect against inconvenient litigation for the defendant 
(citation omitted)); Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm’n, 339
U.S. 643, 648–49 (1950) (noting that the forum’s interest in regulating the defendant’s
conduct and the location of witnesses are factors in determining whether a state has 
jurisdiction over the defendant).
9. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
10. Recently, the Supreme Court revisited the minimum contacts test for the first 
time in two decades in two cases but was unable to produce clear majorities.  Instead, the 
Court’s opinions are likely to add to the confusion and uncertainty.  See Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2856–57 (2011) (holding that 
a North Carolina court cannot exercise general jurisdiction over a non-U.S. subsidiary
solely because the subsidiary’s products were sold in the state); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd.






















    
  





Part IV builds upon this diagnosis by asking what it would mean to
take seriously the notion that corporations are persons.  This Part explains
the main theoretical contributions of this Article.  It develops the normative 
foundations of the personal jurisdiction analysis so that it can be applied 
to corporations while acknowledging the many practical and normative 
differences between natural and artificial persons.  Part IV utilizes 
conceptual frameworks from political philosophy to argue that rights 
and obligations are intertwined.11  As applied to corporations, any viable
theory of political obligation must consider the rights and freedoms a state
grants to corporations before determining whether the corporation is 
obligated to submit to the adjudicatory power of the state.  The rights and 
protections afforded by a state must match the jurisdiction of that state
over artificial or real entities with those rights and protections.  Political 
rights imply political obligations, including submission to the jurisdiction of
the right-granting state. 
Part V reconstructs personal jurisdiction doctrine along these lines.  It 
uses the insights of the political obligation framework developed in Part 
IV to put personal jurisdiction on secure normative foundations that are 
attentive to the practical and legal differences between natural and artificial 
persons.  This Part argues that a more robust understanding of corporate 
citizenship and corporate rights correlates with a more robust ability of
the state to exercise jurisdiction over corporations.12  A corporation’s
general enjoyment and use of political rights must make a finding of
not subject to jurisdiction in New Jersey on any stream-of-commerce theory where it sold
its products to a distributor in Ohio and never entered, advertised, or sold its products in New
Jersey itself); id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[I]t is unwise to announce a rule of
broad applicability without full consideration of the modern-day consequences.”).  See 
generally Borchers, Incoherence, supra note 6, at 1245–46 (arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in J. McIntyre “is a disaster” and judging the decision in Goodyear “not
nearly as bad” but “far from good”); Robin J. Effron, Letting the Perfect Become the 
Enemy of the Good: The Relatedness Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 867, 868 (2012) (“[T]he Court [in J. McIntyre] produced a fractured 4–2– 
3 opinion that resolved little beyond holding that the New Jersey courts could not 
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the instant case.”). 
11. In political philosophy, the legitimacy of the state’s exercise of coercive power 
has been a key issue for a long time.  See infra note 191 and accompanying text.  See 
generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) (asserting that a modern democratic 
state’s authority derives from its citizens’ acceptance of shared philosophical doctrines 
of justice); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986) (arguing that legitimate
political authority entails the right to rule and creates political obligations); A. JOHN SIMMONS, 
JUSTIFICATION AND LEGITIMACY: ESSAYS ON RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS (2001) (arguing 
that political authority may be morally justified without being legitimate, but that only
legitimate authority generates political obligations).
12. This argument could, in theory, go either way.  Just as a court may consider 
corporate rights in the jurisdictional context, so could a court consider jurisdictional 
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general jurisdiction more likely.13  Similarly, courts can use evidence of 
political activities that are directly and closely related to the suit at hand 
to justify imposition of specific jurisdiction.14 
If we take seriously the law’s trend to treat corporations increasingly
as persons, then this is one procedural implication of this development.
For the purposes of this Article, I remain agnostic whether a full-fledged 
or reduced notion of corporate personhood is more desirable.  That is an
important question; one, however, that cannot be answered without
understanding the procedural ramifications of treating corporations as
persons. 
II. THE RISE OF CORPORATIONS AS PERSONS THAT CAN BEAR 
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Corporations are treated under the law as persons unless the context
indicates otherwise.15  As artificial persons, they are treated presumptively 
like actual persons.  Corporate personhood is, of course, a legal fiction.16 
But this legal fiction, like many other legal fictions, has important 
consequences.  By designating a corporation as a kind of person, the law 
grants corporations the capacity for legal action and relations.  As persons, 
corporations have legal standing to hold property, to enter into contracts,
to conduct business, and ultimately, to sue and be sued. 
This Part chronicles the expansion of corporate political rights.  It 
details how corporations were periodically reconceptualized over the last
200 years.  Case law moved from broad skepticism of corporations, to 
conceiving them as artificial creations of state law with no political rights 
and tightly circumscribed and controlled economic rights, to natural entities 
13. See infra Part V.A. 
14. See infra Part V.B. 
15. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress,
unless the context indicates otherwise . . . the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include 
corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock 
companies, as well as individuals.”).  Many state statutes provide for similar definitions. 
See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11022 (West 2007) (“‘Person’ means individual,
corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, 
trust, partnership, limited liability company, or association, or any other legal entity.”).
16. Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation Is a Person: The Language of a Legal 
Fiction, 61 TUL. L. REV. 563, 563 (1987) (“The edification of the corporation to the status of
person is one of the most enduring institutions of the law and one of the most widely
accepted legal fictions.”). See generally  THE CATEGORY OF THE PERSON: ANTHROPOLOGY,
PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY (Michael Carrithers et al. eds., 1985) (discussing various conceptions









   
  
  
   





    




   
 











of private contract with broad economic rights but not political rights, to 
corporate persons with a claim to moral standing, and now to an 
approximation of corporate citizens increasingly difficult to distinguish 
from actual citizens.17 
Each reconceptualization brought corporations as artificial persons
closer to actual persons.  As a result, each step in this process entailed
not only a greater claim to political rights for corporations but also a
greater susceptibility to the burdens of political obligations.  The judicial 
personification of the corporation radically enhanced the position of the 
business corporation by furnishing theoretical grounds to assert political
rights.18 However, unnoticed in this development is that judicial 
personification also makes corporations subject to political obligations. 
17. See generally  JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS 
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780–1970 (1970) (providing an 
overview of the evolution of public policy concerning corporations in the United States);
William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 261 (1992) (attempting to define corporation); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The
Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate 
Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767 (2005) (commenting on corporate theory
transformations from the Roman Empire to the present); William W. Bratton, Jr., The 
New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 
1471 (1989) (examining the theories of the firm in five parts); William W. Bratton, Jr., 
The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407
(1989) (doubting the validity of new economic theories of the firm); John Dewey, The
Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926) (tracing 
the historical background of corporate personhood); Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara
Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173 (1985) (examining
the origins of corporate personality); Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 
HARV. L. REV. 253 (1911) (discussing German and French theories of the corporation in
the nineteenth century); Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in
American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987) (detailing the law’s shifting views of 
corporations); David Millon, State Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of Corporation Law?, 45
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 903 (1988) (describing shifts in corporate law from regulating the 
corporation’s relationship with society to the corporation’s relationship with shareholders);
Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to 
the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97 (2009) (describing 
the contrasting views of the corporation); Miriam Theresa Rooney, Maitland and the 
Corporate Revolution, 26 N.Y.U. L. REV. 24 (1951) (noting the roots of corporate law 
doctrine in medieval canon law); Paul Vinogradeff, Juridical Persons, 24 COLUM. L. 
REV. 594 (1924) (tracing views on corporate personality from the Roman Empire days to
judicial decisions in the early twentieth century); James Boyd White, How Should We 
Talk About Corporations? The Languages of Economics and of Citizenship, 94 YALE
L.J. 1416 (1985) (debating what language the law should use in describing corporate 
limits and purposes).
18. The focus of this Article is on the judicial personification of the corporation. 
For developments in the administrative realm, see, for example, Paul R. Verkuil, The
Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 311–13 (1978), 
which notes that many conflicts over corporate regulations shifted over time from the 
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A.  Corporations at the Founding
English common law has long recognized that corporations are unique 
entities.  As a case from 1612 held, corporations “cannot commit treason, 
nor be outlawed, nor excommunicate, for they have no souls.”19  The  
Founders, worried about corporate power as exemplified by the West Indian
Company, were skeptical of corporations.20  Thomas Jefferson, for example,
warned of the example of England and hoped to “crush in [its] birth the 
aristocracy of our monied corporations which dare already to challenge 
our government to a trial of strength and bid defiance to the laws of our
country.”21  The Constitution and the Bill of Rights do not mention 
corporations.22  Neither do later amendments.23  Perhaps this is the case 
because there were few corporations at the time of the founding and they
possessed little economic power.24 
B.  The Corporation as an Artificial Entity 
Early case law in the young Republic did not conceive of corporations 
as persons or citizens.25  This position quickly began to erode.  Courts in
19. Case of Sutton’s Hosp., (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B.) 973; 10 Co. Rep. 23 a, 
32 b. 
20. See, e.g., Douglas Litowitz, Are Corporations Evil?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 811, 
823 (2004) (“Thomas Jefferson and James Madison cautioned against the dangers of 
corporations, in part because the American colonies were operated as corrupt English 
corporations.”).  For a polemic use of this position, see Ralph Nader & Robert Weissman,
Letter to the Editor: Ralph Nader on Scalia’s “Originalism,” HARV. L. REC. (Nov. 13, 2008, 
12:00 AM), http://hlrecord.org/?p=11026. 
21. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Logan (Nov. 12, 1816), in 12 THE WORKS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 42, 44 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905), available at http://files.liberty 
fund.org/files/808/Jefferson_0054-12_EBk_v6.0.pdf. 
22. See generally Dale Rubin, Corporate Personhood: How the Courts Have
Employed Bogus Jurisprudence To Grant Corporations Constitutional Rights Intended
for Individuals, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 523, 525–34 (2010) (noting that colonial America was
skeptical of corporations); Amanda D. Johnson, Comment, Originalism and Citizens 
United: The Struggle of Corporate Personhood, 7 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 187 (2010) 
(examining to what extent the Constitution and its Framers recognized artificial persons). 
23. See 7 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864–88, pt. 2, at 724 (1987) (“[T]he framers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment did not have corporations in view.”). 
24. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. ROY, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE 
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION IN AMERICA 49 (1997) (noting that at the time of the founding 
there were only six corporations, other than banks, in existence in the colonies). 
25. See, e.g., Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809)
(corporations are not persons as the term is used in Article III and the Judiciary Act of 

















      
 
 




    
 
 
     






   
the early nineteenth century began to conceive of corporations as artificial 
entities—not aggregations—and focused on the state’s constitutive role 
in their creation and maintenance.  Early cases speak of corporations as
entities separate from their shareholders and employees.  For example, in
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, the Supreme Court referred to
the corporation as “an artificial being, invisible [and] intangible.”26  Chief  
Justice Marshall characterized corporations as having “individuality” as
evidenced by holding the power to sue, being amendable to suit, and 
existing independently of the lives of their shareholders.27  Legal treatises
from this era similarly describe the legal framework of a corporation as a
“body, created by law . . . [that is] for certain purposes, considered as a
natural person.”28  Courts in these early cases began to interpret the term
persons in statutes to include corporations as well as natural persons.29 
Separate from their shareholders and employees, corporations under
this framework were conceived as artificial beings.  They were legal
entities and, as such, owed their existence to the positive law of a state.30 
Individual initiative could charter a particular corporation, but its existence,
it was thought, was not intelligible without reference to a legal framework. 
At its most extreme, this position required special acts of the state
legislature for each instance of incorporation.31  Under this conceptual
framework, corporations were undeniably created in part by the state.  In 
contrast to general partnerships that were private agreements and did not
depend on the state, corporations were the artificial creations of a state.
558 (1844) (“[A] corporation created by . . . a particular state, is to be deemed to all intents 
and purposes as a person, although an artificial person, . . . capable of being treated as a 
citizen of that state, as much as a natural person.”).
26. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819). 
27. Id. at 636, 667–68. 
28. JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 1 (John Lanthrop ed., 10th ed. 1875). 
29. See David Millon, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 206 n.18 (citing Loudon v. Coleman,
59 Ga. 653, 655 (1877); People v. Assessors of Watertown, 1 Hill 616, 620–21 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1841); Fisher v. Horicon Iron & Mfg. Co., 10 Wis. 351, 355 (1860)). 
30. This theory is thus sometimes also referred to as the “grant,” “concession,” 
“fiction,” or “creature” theory of the corporation. See, e.g., George Heiman, Introduction to 
OTTO GIERKE, ASSOCIATIONS AND LAW: THE CLASSICAL AND EARLY CHRISTIAN STAGES
27 (George Heiman ed. & trans., 1977) (“[Gierke] contends that the group-person, be it 
fellowship, association or corporation, has the same attributes as the personality derived
from the individual.”); Horwitz, supra note 17, at 181.  For a modern version of this 
position, see Charlie Cray & Lee Drutman, Corporations and the Public Purpose: Restoring 
the Balance, 4 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 305, 307 (2005), which argues “that understanding 
the fundamentally public nature of corporations is the key to restoring democratic control 
over them.” 
31. See generally  LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 188– 
91 (2d ed. 1985) (explaining that legislatures granted charters “by statute, one by one” in
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The state conferred the privileges of incorporation not merely for the 
private benefit of economic gain but also for the public welfare.32 
Corporations under this conception have no independent ontological 
existence and therefore no independent claim to rights or political influence.  
Corporations thus had no political rights in this era.  An early attempt to
cast their artificial personhood as citizenship failed in the Supreme Court.33 
This was the case, in part, because of a suspicion of and hostility toward 
accumulated and entrenched power that might destabilize the political 
balance of power.34  Some states sought to limit the power of corporations
further by setting limits on the amount of capitalization35 and durational
existence.36  Courts also limited the power of corporations by narrowly 
construing corporate charters and powers.37  The most dramatic outgrowth 
of this tendency was development in common law of the ultra vires 
32. See, e.g., Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 548
(1837) (emphasizing that corporations exist to benefit the public).  Given this extent of 
state involvement, few corporations were devoted to pure business objectives.  Instead, 
many corporations chartered in this era pursued public functions like public utilities, 
insurance, and banking.  See HURST, supra note 17, at 17–18; Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth- 
Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 129, 138 (1985). 
33. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1868) (“The term citizens . . . applies 
only to natural persons . . . not to artificial persons created by the legislature . . . .”), overruled 
in part on other grounds by United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
34. See  HURST, supra note 17, at 30–47. See generally David Millon, The 
Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219 (1988) (discussing 
concerns over the relation of economic and political power in the nineteenth century). 
At the extreme, this led some to advocate for the abolition of corporations.  See, e.g., 
MARVIN MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION: POLITICS AND BELIEF 201 (1957). 
35. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 550–54 nn.5–26 (1933) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting in part) (collecting state statutes).
36. Id. at 555 n.29; HURST, supra note 17, at 44–45. 
37. See, e.g., Chewacla Lime-Works v. Dismukes, 6 So. 122, 123 (Ala. 1889)
(holding that a company chartered to mine, manufacture, and sell lime rock products had
no implied or incidental power to carry on general retail business); Day v. Spiral-Spring 
Buggy Co., 23 N.W. 628, 629–30 (Mich. 1885) (holding that a buyer was not permitted
to prevail on breach of contract claims because the contract involved buyer in activity
that went beyond buyer’s corporate charter); People ex rel. Tiffany & Co. v. Campbell, 
38 N.E. 990, 991 (N.Y. 1894) (holding that a corporation chartered to manufacture and 
sell gold and silverware did not have the power to purchase and resell goods purchased
from a foreign manufacturer); Powell v. Murray, 38 N.Y.S. 233, 235 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1896) (“The charter of a corporation is the measure of its power, and the enumeration of
those powers implies the exclusion of all others.” (citing Thomas v. R.R., 101 U.S. 71
(1879))), aff’d mem., 53 N.E. 1130 (N.Y. 1899); see also Daniel B. Klein & John Majewski, 
Economy, Community, and Law: The Turnpike Movement in New York, 1797–1845, 26
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 469, 484–85 (1992) (illustrating the detailed requirements of corporate
charters in the case of New York turnpike companies).
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doctrine.38  Under this doctrine, corporations could not bind themselves
contractually on matters that were beyond the objectives defined in their
charters.39  Similarly, corporations were not allowed to act beyond the
borders of the state that chartered the corporation in the first place.40 
Finally, many states prohibited corporations from acquiring the stock of
other corporations.41  In short, corporations under the artificial entity
framework had no political rights as they were conceived as purely
economic entities, created by the state and subject to significant control
and regulation.
C.  The Corporation as an Aggregate Person 
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, natural entity theory replaced
the conception of the corporation as an artificial creation of state law. 
Under this new theory, the corporation was the creation of private initiative, 
not state power.  This conception held that corporations cannot be created 
without the agreement of human beings and, once created, cannot be run 
without the initiative of human beings.  Corporations, thus understood, are
aggregate persons.42  This aggregate person has no ontological 
status beyond the existence of the natural persons that form and run the
corporation.  The corporation is not, and cannot be, practically or
conceptually distinct from natural persons.43 
38. See generally Daniel Lipton, Note, Corporate Capacity for Crime and Politics:
Defining Corporate Personhood at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, 96 VA. L. REV. 
1911, 1919–21 (2010) (examining the ultra vires label in the context of political expenditures).
39. See Thomas, 101 U.S. at 77 (holding that any ultra vires transaction was void);
Pearce v. Madison & Indianapolis R.R., 62 U.S. (21 How.) 441, 444 (1859) (same). 
40. See, for example, Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586–88
(1839), which held that corporations are not citizens within the meaning of the Article IV
Privileges and Immunities Clause.  Instead, corporations are the creation of state law and 
could thus have no power “where that law ceases to operate.”  Id. at 588.  As Chief Justice
Taney wrote: 
[A] corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the 
sovereignty by which it is created.  It exists only in contemplation of law, and 
by force of the law; and where that law ceases to operate, and is no longer
obligatory, the corporation can have no existence.  It must dwell in the place of
its creation . . . .
Id.
41. See, e.g., California v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 7 RY. & CORP. L.J. 83, 86 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. 1890). 
42. This theory is therefore often called the “aggregate theory” of the corporation.
At times, it is also referred to as the “contractual” or “associational theory” to further
emphasize the conceptual roots of the corporation in the free and consensual association 
or bonding together of individuals. 
43. 1 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1, 
at 2 (2d ed.1886) (“[It is] self-evident that a corporation is not in reality a person or a 
thing distinct from its constituent parts.  The word ‘corporation’ is but a collective name
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Accordingly, corporate theory and legal doctrine shifted away from an
emphasis on grounding the origin of the corporation in a state grant.
Instead, it emphasized the activities of private individuals in forming and 
running corporations.  This shift had important ramifications and
encouraged rethinking the relationship between the corporation and the 
state.
Under the new natural entity theory of the corporation, states gradually
relaxed or eliminated restrictions on the economic power and reach of 
corporations.  The rights of individuals, it was thought, did not go away 
once they bonded together to form and run a corporation. Instead,
the corporation had a claim to these rights as an aggregate of natural 
right bearers.44  Consequently, states began to allow corporations to
purchase the stock of other corporations.45  States also abolished 
capitalization limitations.46  The ultra vires doctrine, meanwhile, was also
slowly disappearing from the common law.47  Similarly, corporations
could now operate beyond the borders of the state that chartered them.48 
Corporations, in short, were no longer limited to the powers conferred
on them by a state.  Because they were now conceived as the creations 
of private initiative, they were no longer the artificial product of state 
action and thus not subject to the probing control of the state.49 
This shift of focus had effects beyond pure economic regulation.  Because
corporations are nothing more than agreements between private individuals,
under the aggregate entity theory of the corporation, corporate property 
44. Id. at 3 (“[T]he rights and duties of an incorporated association are in reality
the rights and duties of the persons who compose it, and not of an imaginary being.”). 
45. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 4, 1888, ch. 269, 1888 N.J. Laws 385; Act of Apr. 7, 
1888, ch. 295, 1888 N.J. Laws 445. 
46. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 550–54 & nn.5–26 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting in part) (collecting state statutes mandating capitalization limits and removing
such limitations).
47. See Charles E. Carpenter, Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires Be Discarded?, 
33 YALE L.J. 49, 50–53 (1923). 
48. See S. Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 416–17 (1910); Ludwig v. W. Union Tel. 
Co., 216 U.S. 146, 164 (1910); Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1910); W. 
Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 18 (1910). 
49. Simultaneously, the effective control of individual shareholders diminished. 
See, e.g., Manson v. Curtis, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (N.Y. 1918) (broadening the managerial 
powers of directors regardless of express delegation by shareholders); Joseph L. Weiner, 
Payment of Dissenting Stockholders, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 547–48 (1927) (discussing
states that no longer required unanimity but only simple majority shareholder approval, 
subject to appraisal rights for dissenters, for mergers and other fundamental corporate 
changes); see also Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 596 (1921) 
(abandoning the unanimity requirement for many de facto consolidations). 
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similarly was nothing more than a kind of private property.50  Therefore, 
corporate property now commanded the same protection as private 
property.51  The same reasoning led the Supreme Court to hold that the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment 
protect corporate, as well as natural, persons.52  These holdings, based on 
50. See, e.g., The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 747–48 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) (“To
deprive the corporation of its property . . . is, in fact, to deprive the corporators of their
property . . . .  [T]he courts will look through the ideal entity and name of the corporation 
to the persons who compose it, and protect them . . . .”), appeal dismissed sub. nom.
Cnty. of San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R., 116 U.S. 138 (1885); see also Santa Clara Cnty. v. S.
Pac. R.R., 18 F. 385, 402–03 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883) (“[Corporate property] is property, 
nevertheless, and the courts will protect it, as they will any other property, from injury or 
spoliation.”), aff’d, 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
51. See Tax Cases, 13 F. at 747–48. 
52. Santa Clara Cnty., 118 U.S. at 396 (“The court does not wish to hear argument
on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,
which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws, applies to these corporations.  We are all of opinion that it does.”).  The 
consequences of this decision are felt in a wide variety of Supreme Court cases that 
depend on the notion that a corporation is a person with respect to property rights.  See
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 880–81 (1985) (Equal Protection Clause); 
Klein v. Bd. of Tax Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19, 24 (1930) (Equal Protection Clause); Frost 
v. Corp. Comm’n, 278 U.S. 515, 522 (1929) (Equal Protection Clause); Louis K. Liggett
Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111 (1928) (Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses), 
overruled on other grounds by N.D. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, 414 
U.S. 156 (1973); Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 400 (1928) (Equal 
Protection Clause), overruled on other grounds by Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts 
Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973); Ky. Fin. Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S. 544, 
550 (1923) (Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 
Ry. v. Vosburg, 238 U.S. 56, 59 (1915) (Equal Protection Clause); S. Ry. v. Greene, 216 
U.S. 400, 412–13 (1910) (Equal Protection Clause); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 
259 (1898) (Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 
522–23 (1898) (Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses); Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. 
v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154 (1897) (“It is well settled that corporations are persons within
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
The rights and securities guaranteed to persons by that instrument cannot be disregarded 
in respect to these artificial entities called corporations any more than they can be in 
respect to the individuals who are the equitable owners of the property belonging to such 
corporations.” (citations omitted)); Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford,
164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896) (“It is now well settled that corporations are persons within the
meaning of the constitutional provisions forbidding the deprivation of property without 
due process of law, as well as a denial of the equal protection of the laws.” (citations
omitted)); Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta R.R. v. Gibbes, 142 U.S. 386, 390–91 (1892)
(Equal Protection Clause); Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U.S. 594, 606 (1890) (Equal 
Protection Clause); Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 458 
(1890) (Due Process Clause); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 
(1889) (Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses); Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 
205, 209–10 (1888) (Equal Protection Clause); Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & 
Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 188–89 (1888); cf. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (finding corporation entitled to compensation under Just
Compensation Clause of Fifth Amendment).  Contra Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 
(1948) (“The rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are . . . 
personal rights.”); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 350–51 (1938)
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a conception of the corporation as an aggregate entity, had far-reaching 
consequences as they laid the groundwork for pre-New Deal challenges 
to the regulation of corporations.53 
Using similar reasoning, the Supreme Court conferred, for the first 
time, Bill of Rights protections on corporations, including Fifth Amendment 
due process rights54 and Fourth Amendment protections.55  Scholars noted 
that individual rights were transposed to corporations and that this entailed a
sharp departure from the principle that the “rights of an individual [were]
subject to his disposition and . . . no one else.”56 However, up to this point 
corporations held rights only to the extent that such rights could be
attributed to a collection of real human beings.  The corporation held
rights only as an aggregate of such individuals. 
D.  The Corporation as a Natural Entity 
The massive expansion of corporations in the late nineteenth century
put strain on the plausibility of the aggregate entity theory of the 
corporation.  Shareholder ownership became increasingly dispersed, and the
power of corporate managers grew dramatically.  It was increasingly
difficult to argue that corporations are simply aggregates of individuals. 
In the minds of many, the corporation had acquired an identity and
existence that was difficult to trace back to a set of human beings.57 
(describing equal protection rights as personal rights); McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & 
Santa Fe Ry., 235 U.S. 151, 161–62 (1914) (asserting that the constitutional right is a 
personal one); but cf. Pembina, 125 U.S. at 187 (holding that a corporation is not a 
citizen within the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause).  For fierce critiques 
of Santa Clara County, see, for example, Howard Jay Graham, Justice Field and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 52 YALE L.J. 851, 853–54, 856 (1943), and Howard Jay Graham, 
The “Conspiracy Theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371 (1938). 
53. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53–54, 64 (1905); Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 590–91 (1897) (holding that the Due Process Clause protects 
liberty of contract); Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 381 (1894) 
(holding that the Due Process Clause subjects state economic regulatory legislation to a
reasonableness test).  See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
739 (1986) (analyzing constitutional challenges to economic regulations during the 
“Lochner era”).
54. Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165, 176 (1893). 
55. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906).  But cf. United States v. Morton 
Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (asserting that in criminal investigations, corporations 
do not have privacy rights equal to those of individuals). 
56. ERNST FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS 47 (1897). 
57. See, e.g., W. Jethro Brown, The Personality of the Corporation and the State, 
21 LAW Q. REV. 365, 370 (1905); George F. Canfield, The Scope and Limits of the 
Corporate Entity Theory, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 128, 128–29 (1917); Dewey, supra note 
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Scholars and courts articulated the natural entity theory of the corporation to
address these perceived shortcomings of the aggregate entity theory.58 
Under the natural entity theory of the corporation, the corporation’s 
existence is not only independent of state law but also independent of the
individuals that form and run the corporation.  Corporations are more 
than the aggregate of the individuals that work for the corporation or own 
stock in it.  They have character, quirks, and institutional memory.  Their 
goals and intentions are not founded in the goals and wills of any individual 
or group of individuals.  As a result, corporations have a social reality that
cannot be captured by a reduction to aggregate action.59 
Corporations are even, and for the first time, capable of criminal liability
under the natural entity theory.60  They can form mens rea and execute
an actus reus independent of the will of any particular individual.61  Law 
thus merely recognizes and sanctions a “naturally” occurring economic
trend.62  Corporations, under this conception, are natural beings, not so 
different from you or me. 
E.  From Corporate Personhood to Corporate Citizenship 
Conceiving of corporations as natural entities cuts both ways.  On the
one hand, if corporations are a kind of natural being, then they should 
enjoy the same rights and protections as other beings.  Anything else 
smacks of discrimination.  On the other hand, if corporations as artificial 
persons are like real persons, then they must also bear the same
responsibilities.  Just as individuals may not simply pursue their own
17, at 666–67; Harold J. Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARV. L. REV. 404, 
404–05 (1916); Machen, supra note 17, at 257; Bryant Smith, Legal Personality, 37 YALE 
L.J. 283, 287–89 (1928). 
58. The natural entity theory of the corporation is also known as the real entity 
theory or realism theory.
59. This perceived insight mirrors developments in sociology at the time. 
60. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494–95 
(1909) (upholding Congress’s imposition of criminal penalties on corporations by
extending the tort doctrine of respondeat superior); see also United States v. Hilton 
Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 1972) (“[T]he strenuous efforts of corporate 
defendants to avoid conviction . . . strongly suggests that Congress is justified in its 
judgment that exposure of the corporate entity to potential conviction may provide a 
substantial spur to corporate action to prevent violations by employees.”). 
61. See generally Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazábal, The Locus of Corporate 
Scienter, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81, 103–10 (explaining how “human” laws apply to
nonhuman entities whose conduct is the result of actions by individuals). 
62. See, e.g., George F. Deiser, The Juristic Person (pt. 3), 57 U. PA. L. REV. 300, 
304 (1909) (“What really happens is that the state finding certain persons standing in a 
certain relation to each other and acting as a unit, upon a request from them, authorizes
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selfish ends without regard to others, so too should corporations consider 
factors beyond profit maximization. 
The natural entity theory of the corporation thus provides a theoretical 
basis for corporate social responsibility.63  Its central tenet is that some 
corporate policies that result in diminished profits are justified.  Where 
other constituencies are affected, corporations can, and perhaps should, 
value those interests more highly than mere profit maximization, just as 
individuals sometimes can and sometimes should value their self-interests
less highly than the interests of those around them.  Corporations, under 
this emerging framework, thus had moral obligations, just as individuals 
do.  In the words of a General Electric Company officer, corporations 
have “public obligations and perform . . . public duties—in a word, vast 
as it is, . . . [the corporation] should be a good citizen.”64  In this  
conceptualization, corporations are not mere economic actors.  They have 
interests and commitments that extend beyond profit. These
extraeconomic interests parallel individual moral and political obligations. 
Corporations are not merely a kind of person; they now are conceived as 
a kind of citizen. 
This is, it turns out, a double-edged sword. The actions of corporations
can now be measured against the broader standard of citizenship, but 
their rights are now also defined by this paradigm.65  The term corporate
citizenship reflects this ambivalence.  On the one hand, it is frequently
invoked by those who look to ground their calls for ethical corporate action 
in a meaningful theoretical framework.66  On the other hand, the term 
63. See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 
45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1162 (1932) (“Business . . . is private property only in a qualified 
sense, and society may properly demand that it be carried on in such a way as to safeguard the
interests of those who deal with it either as employees or consumers . . . .”).
64. Id. at 1154 (quoting JOHN H. SEARS, THE NEW PLACE OF THE STOCKHOLDER 
209 (1929)).  For the most famous critique of Dodd, see generally ADOLF A. BERLE & 
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932), which 
presents a contrasting theory of the corporation as existing to maximize shareholder 
profits. 
65. Cf. Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of 
Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1990) (arguing that corporations now challenge government
regulation as citizens under the Bill of Rights rather than the Fourteenth Amendment). 
66. See, e.g., Edwin M. Epstein, Commentary, The Good Company: Rhetoric or
Reality? Corporate Social Responsibility and Business Ethics Redux, 44 AM. BUS. L.J.
207, 219 (2007); cf. David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to 
Corporate Social Responsiveness, 25 J. CORP. L. 41, 43–45 (1999) (describing corporate 
social responsibility as stemming from the public’s expectation that corporations will













    


















corporate citizenship is also used by corporations that seek to broaden
their political rights to match the rights of proper citizens.  Predictably, 
corporations aggressively pushed for recognition of their newfound rights as
corporate citizens.
One area of law where this development is particularly visible is in the 
context of First Amendment free speech rights.67  For long, the Supreme 
Court did not consider the issue of corporate speech.68  With respect to 
commercial speech, the Court in 1980 overturned a state regulation that 
banned utility corporations from promoting the use of electricity in 
advertisements.69  The Court held that such advertisement is constitutionally
protected free commercial speech under the First Amendment.70 
A corporate ad in the New York Times opined that “voices in a democratic 
society—individual and corporate alike—shouldn’t be stifled or filtered
through Big Nanny.  Whether the topic is cigarettes, or energy policy, or
the latest in designer jeans, the First Amendment shield must never be
lowered, or selectively applied.”71 
Corporations made the same arguments developed in the context of 
commercial speech with respect to political speech.  In a case from 1978, 
a coalition of corporations lead by the First National Bank of Boston72 
raised a First Amendment challenge to a Massachusetts statute that 
67. The First Amendment does not mention actual or artificial persons with respect
to the freedom of speech.  U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
68. See generally Tamara R. Piety,  Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583 (2008) (tracing the evolution of corporate and commercial 
speech jurisprudence); Charles D. Watts, Jr., Corporate Legal Theory Under the First 
Amendment: Bellotti and Austin, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317, 319–20 (1991) (describing 
the role of corporate legal theory in the Supreme Court’s limited First Amendment 
decisions involving corporate speech).  The foundation for corporate speech was laid by
cases about commercial speech, which itself is a recent invention.  The Supreme Court 
considered commercial speech for the first time in 1942.  See Valentine v. Chrestensen,
316 U.S. 52 (1942), overruled by Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).  That year the Court considered the case of a man
who violated a city ordinance by passing out a handbill advertisement.  Id. at 53.  The 
Court held that “purely commercial advertising” has no First Amendment protection.  Id.
at 54.
69. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 572 
(1980). 
70. See id. at 561. Commercial speech is protected by a balancing test and thus
not subject to the same level of protection as other kinds of speech. Id. at 562–64. 
71. Mobil Corp., Advertisement, . . . With Liberty and Justice (and Free Speech) for 
Some, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1987, at A31. 
72. The coalition included the First National Bank of Boston, New England
Merchants National Bank, Gillette Co., Digital Equipment Corp., and Wyman-Gordon
Co.  First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (1978). 
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prohibited corporate campaigning on a graduated income tax referendum.73 
The Supreme Court held that corporate political speech is protected by 
the First Amendment and that the statute is therefore unconstitutional.74 
Corporations also soon gained negative free speech rights.  In a case 
from 1986, the public utility Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E) 
challenged a California state regulation that allowed ratepayer advocacy
groups to enclose inserts in the utility’s billing envelopes.75  The Supreme
Court ruled that PG&E had a constitutionally protected right under the First 
Amendment not to associate with speech it opposed.76 
In the span of less than ten years, corporations had gained commercial, 
political, and negative free speech rights.77  They could now, for the first 
time, intelligibly claim corporate citizenship and the protection of the 
rights this status afforded them. 
This development is the outgrowth of conceiving the corporation as a 
kind of person with an equal claim to citizenship as other kinds of persons. 
As a result, corporations can claim the same rights and protections as
real citizens, but the corporation must also bear the same legal, social, and 
moral responsibilities that the natural citizen carries. 
73. Id. at 769. 
74. Id. at 784, 795.  A number of commentators have critiqued corporate political 
speech rights.  See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 202 (1985) (arguing 
that corporate political speech rights provide an unfair advantage for corporations over 
labor unions); Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under 
the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 294 (1981) (noting the rights and interests of 
dissenting shareholders); Gary Hart & William Shore, Corporate Spending on State and 
Local Referendums: First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
808, 814–17 (1979) (highlighting dangers to the electoral process); Charles R. O’Kelly,
Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression
and the Corporation After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1373 
(1979) (arguing that only individuals can speak and that corporate free speech obscures 
the fact that corporate officers can use corporate assets to broadcast their own views). 
75. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (plurality 
opinion). 
76. Id. at 20–21. 
77. But cf. Adam Winkler, Corporate Personhood and the Rights of Corporate 
Speech, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 868–72 (2007) (arguing that the notion of corporate 
personhood has not played a central role in shaping corporate speech rights and that
these rights are fairly limited).
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F.  Recent Trends 
These cases and reconceptualizations of the corporation culminated in 
Citizens United,78 and it remains unclear what political rights are reserved 
for actual persons and are inaccessible to artificial persons. 
The Supreme Court now grants corporations significant rights as artificial 
persons.  Corporations enjoy Fourteenth Amendment due process 
protection.79 Under the First Amendment, corporations now have political
speech rights,80 commercial speech rights,81 and negative speech rights.82 
The Fourth Amendment grants corporations protection from unreasonable
searches83 and unreasonable warrantless regulatory searches.84  Corporations 
can invoke the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause,85 Takings
Clause,86 and Due Process Clause.87  The Sixth Amendment also grants
corporations the right to a jury trial in criminal cases.88 
78. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
79. See Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886); see also Gulf, 
Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154 (1897) (“It is well settled that 
corporations are persons within the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States.  The rights and securities guaranteed to persons by that
instrument cannot be disregarded in respect to these artificial entities called corporations 
any more than they can be in respect to the individuals who are the equitable owners of 
the property belonging to such corporations.” (citations omitted)); Covington & 
Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896) (“It is now settled that 
corporations are persons within the meaning of the constitutional provisions forbidding
the deprivation of property without due process of law, as well as a denial of the equal 
protection of the laws.” (citations omitted)).
80. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978). 
81. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561–62 
(1980). 
82. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 20 (1986)
(plurality opinion) (holding that corporations have a right not to be forced to associate 
with the speech of others).
83. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906). 
84. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312–13 (1978).  But see Donovan v. 
Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981) (providing an exception for mining industry); United 
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972) (providing an exception for firearms industry); 
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76 (1970) (providing an exception 
for liquor industry).  Because these industries function with licenses from the state, the 
Court reasoned that they implicitly waived their Fourth Amendment rights. See Marshall, 
436 U.S. at 313 (“The businessman in a regulated industry in effect consents to the restrictions 
placed upon him.” (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
85. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 575 (1977) (holding
that the acquittal of a corporation in accordance with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
is not appealable because of the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy).
86. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (holding that corporations
are entitled to compensation under Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
87. Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165, 176 (1893). But cf. Hale, 
201 U.S. at 75 (“While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions
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Circuit courts have also held that the Constitution affords corporations 
a liberty interest in their reputation,89 protects corporations from compelled
speech,90 and grants corporations protection under the dormant Commerce 
Clause and the right to bring suit under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act.91  Some circuits have gone so far as to claim that “[c]orporations are
persons whose rights are protected by the [Civil Rights Act],”92 can bring 
actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,93 and can have legally operative racial 
and tribal identities.94 
Corporations have also attempted to use the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment to claim that government regulations infringe the religious
rights of the corporation.95  A growing literature is exploring the possibility 
with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an 
abuse of such privileges.”). 
88. See Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 76–77 (1908) (labeling
a corporate defendant convicted of violating a federal criminal statute as an “accused”
for Sixth Amendment purposes); United States v. R.L. Polk & Co., 438 F.2d 377, 379
(6th Cir. 1971) (“[A] fundamental principle [is] that corporations enjoy the same rights
as individuals to trial by jury . . . .”); see also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 532–33 (1970) 
(implying a right to a jury trial in civil cases for corporations because a shareholder in a 
derivative suit would have that right). 
89. Old Dominion Dairy Prods., Inc. v. Sec’y of Def., 631 F.2d 953, 961–63 (D.C.
Cir. 1980). 
90. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1996). 
91. S.D. Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583, 587, 589–91 (8th Cir. 2003).
92. Des Vergnes v. Seekonk Water Dist., 601 F.2d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 1979) (citations 
omitted).  But cf. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
263 (1977) (“[A] corporation . . . has no racial identity and cannot be the direct target of 
. . . discrimination.”).
93. Cal. Diversified Promotions, Inc. v. Musick, 505 F.2d 278, 283 (9th Cir. 1974)
(“[Corporate] suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . are permissible.” (citations omitted));
Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 472 F.2d 732, 733 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that 
corporations are persons “whose rights are protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983”). 
94. See, e.g., Bains LLC v. Arco Prods. Co., 405 F.3d 764, 770 (9th Cir. 2005)
(finding that corporation “undoubtedly acquired an imputed racial identity”); Thinket Ink
Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2004) (observing 
that a corporation acquired “an imputed racial identity”); Pourier v. S.D. Dep’t of
Revenue, 658 N.W.2d 395, 404 (S.D. 2003) (holding that corporation was “enrolled member” 
of Indian tribe), aff’d in relevant part and rev’d in part on other grounds on reh’g, 674
N.W.2d 314 (S.D. 2004); see also Richard R.W. Brooks, Incorporating Race, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2023, 2094 (2006) (“In the past, courts have pursued equitable outcomes without 
attributing race to corporations.  There is currently a movement away from these prior 
practices and toward a more liberal recognition of race with respect to corporate persons.”). 
95. See, e.g., Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1248, 1255, 1257–
66 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (considering the successful Free Exercise Clause claim of “two
pharmacists and one corporate pharmacy” against a federal regulation requiring that 
pharmacies dispense contraceptives and abortifacients), rev’d, 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 








   
  
 
   
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
   
 
   
   
  
    




   
 
    
  
 
   
  
    
   
 
   
 
 
of corporate religious identities.96  The notion of corporate personhood is
also steadily evolving with regard to the moral agency of corporations,97 
the availability of human rights claims for corporations,98 protection for 
corporations under the Eighth Amendment,99 corporate capacity for
mens rea,100 character evidence,101 and global corporate citizenship.102 
2007) (examining challenge to a state regulation on the same issue by corporate and
individual defendants), rev’d, 901 N.E.2d 373 (Ill. 2008). 
96. Some commentators have argued that religion helps drive business ethics.  See, 
e.g., Timothy L. Fort, Commentary, Religious Belief, Corporate Leadership, and Business
Ethics, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 451, 452 (1996) (“Religious convictions provide some business 
leaders with a strong motivation for conducting business ethically even when their profit 
motive might not.”); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory, 
56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 31–44 (2006) (arguing corporate religious identities can encourage 
corporations to act beyond their own narrow economic interest); Susan J. Stabile, Using 
Religion To Promote Corporate Responsibility, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839, 873–78
(2004) (describing the ways various faiths encourage businesses to consider the common
good).  But cf. Scott Fitzgibbon, “True Human Community”: Catholic Social Thought, 
Aristotelean Ethics, and the Moral Order of the Business Company, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
1243 (2001) (questioning whether corporate persons can be moral or religious); William 
Quigley, Catholic Social Thought and the Amorality of Large Corporations: Time To
Abolish Corporate Personhood, 5 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 109, 125–28 (2004) (same). 
97. Commentators have questioned the ability of corporations to maintain morality. 
See, e.g., Thomas Donaldson, Moral Agency and Corporations, 10 PHIL. CONTEXT 54, 58 
(1980) (arguing that corporations cannot qualify as moral persons because they are 
incapable of having the same moral rights as humans); Manuel G. Velasquez, Why 
Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do, BUS. & PROF. ETHICS 
J., Spring 1983, at 1, 6–10 (arguing that moral responsibility cannot be ascribed to
corporations because they cannot fulfill the actus reus and mens rea elements). But cf.
PETER A. FRENCH ET AL., CORPORATIONS IN THE MORAL COMMUNITY 12–23 (1992) (insisting 
that the corporation is a moral person and can carry moral responsibility for collective
acts and intentions that simply cannot be attributed to any one human member). 
98. Lucien J. Dhooge, Human Rights for Transnational Corporations, 16 J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 197, 200 (2007) (“[T]ransnational corporations possess legal 
personality sufficient to be granted rights in a manner similar to those granted to human
beings in modern human rights law.”).  See generally CHRISTOPHER N. J. ROBERTS, THE 
CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS (forthcoming 2013). 
99. Elizabeth Salisbury Warren, Note, The Case for Applying the Eighth Amendment to 
Corporations, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (1996) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment centers 
around protecting property rights rather than personal rights, and therefore its extension
[to corporations] does not threaten individual liberties.”); see also Browning-Ferris 
Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 n.22 (1989) (“We shall not 
decide whether the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines applies to the 
several States through the Fourteenth Amendment, nor shall we decide whether the 
Eighth Amendment protects corporations as well as individuals.”). 
100. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095 (1991) (developing a method for proving corporate 
intent); Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 833 (2000); Elizabeth R. Sheyn, The Humanization of the Corporate
Entity: Changing Views of Corporate Criminal Liability in the Wake of Citizens United,
65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (2010) (examining how Citizens United could affect approaches
to corporate criminal liability); Daniel Lipton, Note, Corporate Capacity for Crime and
Politics: Defining Corporate Personhood at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, 96 VA. 
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Most recently, the Supreme Court announced in Citizens United that a 
ban on corporate speech in the months preceding an election violates the
First Amendment.103  The Court held that First Amendment protections
apply to corporate political expenditures even if the use of corporate funds
does not have a “material effect on its business or property.”104  Bans on 
political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity are now prima 
facia violations of the First Amendment.105  Federal and state governments
may not limit corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in
candidate elections.  The majority in Citizen United argued that political
speech is essential to the functioning of a democracy.106  Whether this 
speech comes from an individual or corporation is not relevant, according to 
the majority.107  Under Citizens United, corporations, as artificial persons, 
are equal to actual persons, at least with respect to the Free Speech Clause 
of the First Amendment.108 
101. Susanna M. Kim, Characteristics of Soulless Persons: The Applicability of the
Character Evidence Rule to Corporations, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 763 (arguing against 
extending the ban on character evidence to corporations). 
102. See Rachel J. Anderson, Toward Global Corporate Citizenship: Reframing 
Foreign Direct Investment Law, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 1 (2009) (examining corporate 
global citizenship in the context of foreign direct investment law). 
103. 130 S. Ct. 876, 897, 917 (2010).  The decision has spawned widespread
speculation.  See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate Campaign Spending 
Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at A1 (“The ruling represented a sharp doctrinal shift,
and it will have major political and practical consequences.”); Jess Bravin, Court Kills 
Limits on Corporate Politicking, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748703699204575016942930090152.html (“The ruling not only
strikes down the federal requirement, it also calls into question similar provisions enacted by
nearly half the states.”).  For an earlier, related case, see FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 
Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 476 (2007), in which the Court held that a prohibition on the use of 
corporate treasury funds for political advertisements in the sixty days before an election 
is unconstitutional as applied to advertisements that do not explicitly endorse or oppose a 
candidate. 
104. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 
435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)). 
 105. Thus overturning Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
106. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898. 
107. Id. at 898–99. 
108. Id. at 900 (“Under the rationale of these precedents, political speech does not 
lose First Amendment protection ‘simply because its source is a corporation.’” (quoting
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784)); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1,
8 (1986) (plurality opinion) (“The identity of the speaker is not decisive in determining
whether speech is protected.  Corporations and other associations, like individuals, 
contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas’ that



















   
 
 
    
   
 
   
    
 
  
    
 
Citizens United reignited the debate over corporate personhood and 
corporate citizenship.  At heart, this debate is over the scope and meaning of
the seemingly simple claim that corporations are artificial persons.109  As 
artificial persons, do they enjoy the same rights and protections as actual
persons?  Do they bear the same obligations?  Over time, courts and
regulators have answered this question differently, at times granting 
corporations few economic and political rights, and, more recently, granting 
corporations more and more rights. 
At the same time that courts have expanded the political rights of
corporations, they have restricted the ability of the state to exercise 
jurisdiction over them,110 readily granted forum non conveniens motions to
corporations,111 limited the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws,112 
and made it easier for corporations to avoid the reach of courts altogether by
committing customers and employees to binding arbitration.113 The 
109. For commentaries on legal personhood in general, see Jessica Berg, Of 
Elephants and Embryos: A Proposed Framework for Legal Personhood, 59 HASTINGS 
L.J. 369 (2007), and Barbara Johnson, Anthropomorphism in Lyric and Law, 10 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN. 549 (1998). 
110. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851
(2011) (holding that there was no general jurisdiction over a non-U.S. subsidiary in
North Carolina based solely on the subsidiary’s products being sold in the state); J. 
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011) (holding that a non-U.S.
company is not subject to jurisdiction in New Jersey on any stream-of-commerce theory
where it sold its products to a distributor in Ohio and never entered, advertised, or sold 
its products in New Jersey itself); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 
145 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that the Alien Tort Statute does not provide federal subject 
matter jurisdiction for claims against corporations), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 
1659 (2013). But see Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 927 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(arguing, in response to a finding that the defendant did not have continuous and
systematic contacts with the forum, that promoting international human rights was a state 
interest that should factor into a finding of personal jurisdiction). 
111. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 303
F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002). 
112. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877–78 (2010) (affirming
that canon or presumption that U.S. laws do not apply extraterritorially applies to the 
Securities Exchange Act). This holding abrogated earlier circuit cases to the contrary,
including Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 1998); Grunenthal 
GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir. 1983); Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. 
Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 418–20 (8th Cir. 1979); and SEC v. Kasser, 
548 F.2d 109, 115 (3d Cir. 1977). 
113. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (holding
that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts states from conditioning the enforcement of an 
arbitration agreement on the availability of class-wide arbitration procedures); Rent-a-
Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2279 (2010) (holding that parties alleging
that an agreement was unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable must submit that 
challenge first to the arbitrator rather than to the court); 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 
S. Ct. 1456, 1474 (2009) (holding enforceable a collective bargaining agreement that required 
union members to submit claims under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act to arbitration); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 359 (2008) (holding that an agreement to
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Supreme Court also recently held that the “term ‘individual’ as used in the 
[Torture Victim Protection] Act encompasses only natural persons.”114 
More recently, in a case considering whether artificial persons can be 
sued under the Alien Tort Statute or whether the statute applies only to
natural persons, the Court ruled on other grounds and left in place a notable 
circuit split on corporate amenability to lawsuits brought under the 
statute.115 
In short, the significant shifts in reconceptualizing corporations and
endowing them with political rights and freedoms went unnoticed in the
context of political obligations, most centrally the obligation to submit to
the jurisdiction of a rights-granting state. 
III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION BEYOND LEGITIMACY 
As the previous Part showed, corporations are not immutable entities.
They look and are allowed to behave differently at different times.  Once 
bearers of mere economic rights, corporations have now morphed into 
entities with significant political rights.  This change has made it intelligible
to call corporations persons.  As persons, corporations are now subject to
political obligations.  In turn, the state’s exercise of coercive authority over 
corporations must now conform to the standards of legitimacy.
Personal jurisdiction doctrine has not been attentive to the changing 
nature of corporate identities.  Without this conceptual foundation, personal
jurisdiction doctrine focused exclusively on when an exercise of jurisdiction 
is just, but it neglected to ask when the exercise of jurisdiction is legitimate. 
This Part demonstrates how personal jurisdiction doctrine has developed 
oblivious to considerations of corporate identity and legitimacy.  Instead,
personal jurisdiction doctrine has focused exclusively on justice at the
expense of legitimacy.
Courts and scholars of personal jurisdiction have overlooked that the 
evolution of corporate personhood, recently culminating in Citizens
United, makes corporations amendable to an analysis of a state’s legitimate 
initially to an administrative agency); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 
U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (holding that the validity of a contract that contains an arbitration
clause must first be resolved by the arbitrator rather than by a state court).
114. Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1705 (2012). 
115. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659; see also Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 
11, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that corporations are not immune from liability under 
the Alien Tort Statute); Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 145 (concluding that the Alien Tort Statute 
does not create corporate liability). 
149















    




















right to exercise coercive power over the artificial individual in dispute.116 
Legitimacy and political obligations, concepts previously applicable only
to natural persons, can now serve as the cornerstones of the minimum 
contacts test for artificial persons like corporations. 
Previous scholarship has not treated corporations as the kind of entities
that can have political obligations.117  Lacking this pillar, the minimum
contacts factors have focused on justice instead, testing whether the
imposition or denial of jurisdiction would be just to the defendant,
the plaintiff, or the forum.118  Personal jurisdiction cases have leaned
116. See supra Part II.F.
117. Most accounts of personal jurisdiction focus on due process, the interests of the
forum, or the inconveniences to the defendant. See, e.g., Harold S. Lewis, Jr., A Brave New 
World for Personal Jurisdiction: Flexible Tests Under Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. 
REV. 1 (1984) (focusing on expectations and benefits); Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, 
Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1 (2006) (focusing on the Due Process Clause); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, 
Liberty, Substantive Due Process, and Personal Jurisdiction, 82 TUL. L. REV. 567 (2007) 
(defending “the view that constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction arise from basic 
substantive due process principles”); Linda Sandstrom Simard, Meeting Expectations: Two 
Profiles for Specific Jurisdiction, 38 IND. L. REV. 343 (2005) (exploring the Due Process 
Clause’s ability “to predict and control . . . jurisdictional exposure”); A. Benjamin Spencer,
Jurisdiction To Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 617 (2006) (focusing
on notice and legitimate state interests); Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate 
Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 747 (1987) (arguing for
a personal jurisdiction test based on state regulatory interests); James Weinstein, The 
Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 
VA. L. REV. 169 (2004) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s focus on the Due Process clause 
as the sole source of personal jurisdiction).  But cf. Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look 
at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 726 (1988) [hereinafter Brilmayer et al., 
A General Look] (“Adjudicative jurisdiction is one way in which the state asserts coercive
power over individuals.  Consequently, the legitimacy of a particular assertion of state 
power is always an issue.”); Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74 MINN. 
L. REV. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory] (identifying
consent as a jurisdictional factor); Lea Brilmayer, Liberalism, Community, and State Borders, 
41 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1991) (identifying the sources of different triggering factors for jurisdiction
in “traditional liberalism” and communitarianism); Lea Brilmayer, Credit Due Judgments and 
Credit Due Laws: The Respective Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in the 
Interstate Context, 70 IOWA L. REV. 95 (1984) (identifying the role of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause in personal jurisdiction).
118. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987)
(“A court must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and
the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief.”); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (listing “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the 
most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in 
furthering fundamental substantive social policies” as factors relevant to jurisdiction
(citing Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93, 98 (1978))); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 
U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (noting the defendant’s purposeful availment of the forum state); 
Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm’n, 339 U.S. 643, 648–49
(1950) (examining the forum’s interest in regulating the defendant’s conduct and the 
location of witnesses); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 314–15, 317, 320 (1945) 
(probing for defendant’s past conduct with regard to the case at hand and examining the 
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heavily on the notion of justice through the ages,119 and the main thrust
of the current regime remains on the justice of imposing jurisdiction.120 
It leaves aside whether the imposition of jurisdiction would be legitimate.
Justice and legitimacy are two distinct concepts.121  Justice measures
the extent to which a state succeeds at furthering just policies.  Typically, 
this is a function of distributive principles that structure the allocation of
the benefits and burdens of economic activity.122 In contrast, legitimacy 
measures whether one can furnish a compelling justification for the
authority of the state, coercive and otherwise.123  Often, these justifications
turn on the mode of selecting political leadership or the method of 
determining policies.124  Thus, although theories of justice are usually 
concerned with policies and outcomes, legitimacy is typically concerned
with the process that generates these policies and shapes the outcomes.
Just states are often legitimate.  However, that is merely an empirical
regularity, not a conceptual necessity.  A state might be legitimate but not
just, just as a state might be just but not legitimate.  The traditional example 
of an illegitimate state is one controlled by a despot or a foreign power.125 
119. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882) (arguing that consent 
made the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the corporation “eminently fit and just”); 
Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350, 368–69 (1874) (emphasizing the importance of 
personal jurisdiction because judgment without proper notice and opportunity to be 
heard amounts to “judicial usurpation and oppression, and never can be upheld where 
justice is justly administered”); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407 
(1856) (“[The] principle of natural justice . . . forbids condemnation without opportunity
for defence.”); Kilburn v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37, 40 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) (“To bind a 
defendant personally by a judgment when he was never personally summoned, or had
notice of the proceeding, would be contrary to the first principles of justice.”).
120. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (emphasizing the importance of “traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice” for the personal jurisdiction analysis (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
121. See A. JOHN SIMMONS, Justification and Legitimacy, in JUSTIFICATION 
AND LEGITIMACY, supra note 11, at 122, 122 (arguing that the contemporary philosophy
of “showing that a state is justified and showing that it is legitimate . . . [by] requir[ing] 
the very same arguments . . . obscures the difference between” these two separate concepts). 
122. See, e.g., Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113–14 (balancing the “severe” burden on the 
defendant against the plaintiff’s minimal benefit). 
123. See generally RAWLS, supra note 11 (examining social cooperation); RAZ, supra
note 11 (arguing that legitimate political authority entails the right to rule and creates 
political obligations); SIMMONS, supra note 11 (arguing that political authority may be 
morally justified without being legitimate, but that only legitimate authority generates 
political obligations). 
 124. SIMMONS, supra note 121, at 137. 
125. Cf. id. at 130 (arguing that states are legitimate only with the “consent of their 
members”).
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Yet it is imaginable that the despot enacts benevolent rules that lead to 
beneficial and just outcomes.  Similarly, one could think of an enlightened 
colonial regime that orders relations among its subjects in a socially just 
manner.126  Similarly, an entirely legitimate state might enact, with the
best intentions, misconceived policies that have disastrous and unjust
consequences.  Political legitimacy and justice might thus come apart in 
many ways.  Ideally, political institutions and practices strive to satisfy
the requirements of both justice and legitimacy. 
However, the current personal jurisdiction doctrine is exclusively focused 
on justice and completely neglects questions of legitimacy.  This is an
important and dangerous oversight.  Any exercise of legitimate state power
must contain a set of reasons that explain why the state coercion over the
person is justified.127  Legitimacy thus depends on connecting political
obligations with political rights.  Without legitimate political obligations, 
the state’s exercise of power, including the power of its courts, is arbitrary 
and coercive.  However, when such an exercise of power is grounded in
a compelling framework of political obligations, it becomes legitimate.
Courts should thus not only ask whether the imposition of personal 
jurisdiction is just but also whether it is legitimate.  To do so, they must
include in their minimum contacts test an analysis of the political
obligations and political rights of the defendant. 
To make this argument, this Part begins where jurisdiction did, with 
the court’s power to bind persons in its jurisdiction.  Jurisdiction is the 
authority of a court to hear and decide a case.128  Without jurisdiction, a
court has no authority to issue a binding opinion.129  The jurisdiction of
federal courts is grounded in the Constitution.  However, the Constitution 
speaks in a precise way only to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.130 
Congress defines the jurisdiction of lower courts, subject to the more
general constraints imposed by the Constitution.131  Federal courts possess
only the jurisdiction authorized by the Constitution and statute.132  Congress 
may bestow inferior federal courts with less jurisdiction than could 
126. None of this, of course, is meant to suggest that we should accept some despots 
or cherish some colonial regimes.  These extreme hypotheticals are merely meant to illustrate
that justice and legitimacy do not need to go hand in hand.
127. For an example of such coercion, see infra text accompanying notes 253–56. 
128. See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 538 (1974) (citing Fair v. Kohler Die &
Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913)). 
129. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998). 
 130. U.S. CONST. art. III. 
131. See, e.g., Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 93 (2005); Kline v. Burke 
Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233–34 (1922). 
132. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005). 
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potentially be authorized under the Constitution,133 but never more.134 
Courts always have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction.135 
Personal jurisdiction, also known as in personam jurisdiction, gives a 
court the authority to issue binding decisions on persons involved in a civil 
case.136 Personal jurisdiction is the jurisdiction of courts over persons.  
There is no separate corporate jurisdiction analysis.  Corporations are
treated as persons for personal jurisdiction questions. 
Personal jurisdiction cases typically probe whether the contacts of the
defendant and plaintiff—artificial or natural—with the forum were of 
the quality and quantity to render the exercise of jurisdiction just.
Nowhere in the history and development of the doctrine is the doctrine 
concerned with questions of obligations and legitimacy. 
A.  Justice as Notice
During the nineteenth century, personal jurisdiction was based on 
notice within the forum.137  Courts had jurisdiction over a person, artificial
or natural, insofar as they were able to bind persons and things present
within their territory.  As the Court explained, the “principle of natural
justice . . . forbids condemnation without opportunity for defence.”138 
Judgment without proper notice and opportunity to be heard amounts to
133. See, e.g., Ankenbrandt ex rel. L.R. v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 697 (1992) (quoting 
Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401 (1973)). 
134. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491 (1983); 
see also Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809) (“Turn to the article 
of the consitution of the United States, for the statute cannot extend the jurisdiction
beyond the limits of the constitution.”). 
135. See, e.g., United States. v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002). 
 136. I will leave aside questions of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction in this subpart.
137. See generally Andrew L. Strauss, Where America Ends and the International 
Order Begins: Interpreting the Jurisdictional Reach of the U.S. Constitution in Light of a 
Proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Satisfaction of Judgments, 61 ALB. L.
REV. 1237, 1250–54 (1998) (chronicling cases and the “era of territorial jurisdiction”). 
138. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407 (1856) (emphasis 
added); see also D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 175 (1851) (“Now it was 
most reasonable, on general principles of comity and justice, that, among States and their 
citizens united as ours are, judgments rendered in one should bind citizens of other 
States, where defendants had been served with process, or voluntarily made defence.”); 
Kilburn v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37, 40 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) (“To bind a defendant 
personally by a judgment when he was never personally summoned, or had notice of the 



























“judicial usurpation and oppression, and never can be upheld where 
justice is justly administered.”139 
After the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the notion of “natural 
justice” merged with the Due Process Clause.  In Pennoyer v. Neff
the Supreme Court relied on the Fourteenth Amendment to hold that a 
state court lacked the power to assume jurisdiction over a defendant that 
was neither domiciled nor present in the state.140  For jurisdiction to exist,
the Supreme Court concluded, the plaintiff must serve a nonconsenting,
nonresident defendant within the state’s boundaries.141  Exercises of
authority beyond the territorial limits of a state are an improper exercise 
of power that fails to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.142  For an exercise of jurisdiction to be just under this
framework, the defendant had to be physically present within the forum 
when served so as to afford an opportunity to defend.143 
The Court in Pennoyer was concerned with the due process rights of 
individuals.  The territoriality test probes whether the exercise of state
authority affords the defendant a just opportunity to defend the suit.  Justice, 
tied to a territorial framework, was the guiding principle of the early
constitutional personal jurisdiction analysis. 
This framework for testing whether an exercise of jurisdiction was just 
or not proved workable for individuals and resident corporations that 
could be said to be present in the forum and be served in the forum.  But
what about nonresident corporations?  Under what theory of corporate 
personhood can they be said to be present within a given state? 
Corporations have no body that can be present or not.  Their “presence” 
must thus be ascribed either to corporate activity or corporate agents.144 
But do any corporate activities, no matter how small or unintentional, make 
the corporation present in the forum so that it can be served?  If a 
corporation really has “no legal existence out of the boundaries of the
sovereignty by which it is created,”145 then how can a corporation ever
be subject to personal jurisdiction outside of its place of incorporation? 
139. Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350, 369 (1874). 
140. 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877), overruled by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
141. Id. at 733–34. 
142. Id. at 720. 
143. Id. at 722 (“[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over 
persons and property within [a state’s] territory . . . [and] no State can exercise direct
jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory.” (citations 
omitted)).
144. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“Since the 
corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction intended to be acted upon as though 
it were a fact, it is clear that unlike an individual its ‘presence’ without, as well as within, 
the state of its origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf by those
who are authorized to act for it.” (citation omitted)).
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And what about corporate agents?  Can any corporate agent be served on
behalf of the whole company?  Justice as notice provides answers for
natural persons, but presents many intractable conceptual problems for
nonresident corporations.  In an age of increased interstate commerce, this 
spelled trouble. 
B.  Justice as Consent 
To prevent personal jurisdiction from becoming unjust, a framework
other than notice had to be able to account for nonresident corporations. 
The partial answer was to reconceptualize justice as consent.146  Strictly
speaking, consent does not modify distributive justice evaluations, but 
consent can be and has been used, as a practical matter, to alleviate concerns
about injustice. 
Legislators and courts began to argue in this vein that corporate activity
outside the state of incorporation was dependent upon the permission of
the government where the nonresident corporation desired to operate.147 
Many states subsequently conditioned such permissions on the appointment 
of a local agent.  Such an agent could then be served within the boundaries 
of the state. The reasoning went that by doing business within the state, 
the corporation consented to the appointment of a local agent and to be sued 
146. Consent can be conceptualized as providing either the foundation of justice or
the foundation of legitimacy.  For consent to be the basis for legitimacy, it must fulfill
different requirements than when it serves as the basis for justice. See supra notes 121– 
26 and accompanying text.  Whatever the difference, although some articulations of the 
Court are compatible with legitimacy arguments, the Court focused on notions of justice 
instead.
147. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882) (“The State may, therefore, impose 
as a condition upon which a foreign corporation shall be permitted to do business within
her limits, that it shall stipulate that in any litigation arising out of its transactions in the 
State, it will accept as sufficient the service of process on its agents or persons specially
designated . . . .”); see also Commercial Mut. Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245, 253 
(1909) (“In view of the fact that much of the business of the country is done by
corporations having foreign charters and principal offices remote from States wherein 
they transact business, it has been found necessary to make provision for the service of
summons upon local agents, in order to give jurisdiction to try controversies which have 
originated in such States.  With this purpose in view many States have provided that 
foreign corporations, in order to do business within the State, must make provision for
service upon some local agent, or by authority conferred upon some state officer to 
accept service of summons.  And but for such statutes and the authority given by the
States to obtain service upon local agents there could be no recovery upon the contracts 
of such companies, unless redress be sought in a distant State where the company may












   




















     
in the state. Such consent was a valid basis of jurisdiction for the state 
courts as well as the federal courts within that state.148 
As the Court noted in St. Clair v. Cox, the consent made the exercise 
of personal jurisdiction over the corporation “eminently fit and just.”149 
After all, didn’t the corporation consent to the jurisdiction?  Although
perhaps not legitimate, what could be more indicative of justice being 
served?150 
Besides not making any allowances for notions of legitimacy, justice 
as consent over nonresident corporations quickly encountered four
roadblocks.  First, many states did not extract actual consent from
nonresident corporations as a condition of doing business.151  Instead, they
relied on implied consent as a foundation of the just exercise of 
jurisdiction.152  This raises questions about whether the consent was actually 
meaningful or simply a fiction to disguise an unjust personal jurisdiction 
regime.153 
Second, simply because consent was extracted as a condition of doing 
business does not mean that it extends to all possible cases.  As the Court 
recognized, the consent can be said to meaningfully apply only to cases
that had the right kind of connection to the forum.154  A corporation might
appoint an agent but not actually conduct business in the state, or have not 
conducted business in some years.  Consent, in such situations, is
insufficient to provide for a just exercise of jurisdiction.155 
148. See, e.g., Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369, 376 (1878). 
149. 106 U.S. at 356 (emphasis added). 
150. This statement captures the conceptual intuition that my consent to the unjust 
acts of a dictator might overcome concerns about the present injustice, but my consent 
does not render the dictator’s rule legitimate. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying 
text.
151. For the problems that arise where a company had not appointed an agent for 
the service of process, see Simon v. Southern Railway, 236 U.S. 115 (1915), and Old Wayne
Mutual Life Ass’n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907). 
152. St. Clair, 106 U.S. at 356 (“And such condition and stipulation may be implied
as well as expressed.”).
153. See Bagdon v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 111 N.E. 1075, 1076 (N.Y. 
1916) (“The distinction is between a true consent and an imputed or implied consent, 
between a fact and a fiction.”).
154. See, e.g., St. Clair, 106 U.S. at 356–57 (noting that the corporation’s consent 
can extend only to “any litigation arising out of its transactions in the State” and that the
corporation must be “engaged in business in the State”).
155. See, e.g., Peterson v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 205 U.S. 364, 390 (1907) 
(“It is settled by the decisions of this court that foreign corporations can be served with 
process within the State only when doing business therein, and such service must be 
upon an agent who represents the corporation in its business.” (citations omitted)); Pa. 
Lumbermen’s Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U.S. 407, 413 (1905) (“In order that a 
Federal court may obtain jurisdiction over a foreign corporation the corporation must, among
other things, be doing business within the State.” (citations omitted)); Conley v. Mathieson 
Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 406, 410–11 (1903) (holding that service within the state on
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Third, consent to appoint an agent often proved of little practical utility. 
For example, some agents simply did not inform the corporation of the 
receipt and content of the process they received.  Such lack of notice
undermined the justice of basing personal jurisdiction on consent, even 
where an agent had been appointed and served for business connected to
the forum.156 
Fourth, states could only meaningfully extract consent from nonresident 
corporations as long as they were able to exclude or prevent nonconsenting
corporations from conducting business within their borders.157  Over time, 
changes in the interstate commerce doctrine weakened a state’s power to 
exclude nonresident corporations.158  Because the states could no longer
exclude, they could no longer extract explicit consent.  Increased reliance
on implicit consent raised the question, why bother with the consent
framework at all if it provides only such a thin and fragile cover of justice?
With these conceptual problems built into the justice as consent 
framework, the Court searched for a new approach to personal jurisdiction. 
This approach would incorporate the previous frameworks of notice and
consent and build upon the notion that the nature and quantity of the
defendant’s contacts with the forum could render the exercise of jurisdiction 
just. 
over the corporation where, at the time of such service, it had ceased to do business 
within the state and had designated no agent upon whom service could be made); Goldey
v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518, 521–22 (1895) (holding that service upon an officer of 
a corporation that neither was doing business within the state nor had an agent or property
therein was insufficient).
156. See Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 19 (1928) (“[T]he enforced acceptance 
of the service of process on a state officer by the defendant would not be fair or due 
process unless such officer or the plaintiff is required to mail the notice to the defendant,
or to advise him, by some written communication, so as to make it reasonably probable 
that he will receive actual notice.”). But cf. Commercial Mut. Accident Co. v. Davis, 
213 U.S. 245, 255 (1909) (“We think the State did not exceed its power and did no
injustice to the corporation by requiring that when it clothed an agent with authority to 
adjust or settle the loss, such agent should be competent to receive notice, for the company,
of an action concerning the same.”). 
157. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 181 (1868) (“Having no absolute
right of recognition in other States, but depending for such recognition and the enforcement
of its contracts upon their assent, it follows, as a matter of course, that such assent may
be granted upon such terms and conditions as those States may think proper to impose.”),
overruled on other grounds by United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 
(1944). 
158. See generally Int’l Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910) (explaining doctrine
under which states cannot unnecessarily burden interstate commerce); Pensacola Tel. Co. 








   
 




















      
   




C.  Justice as Presence
Perhaps the foundations of a just exercise of jurisdiction were not to be 
found in notice or consent, but in the contacts of the corporation with the
forum.  This insight builds upon the consent cases that held that consent 
alone is insufficient to establish just grounds for jurisdiction—the
corporation must be engaged in some kind of activity within the forum.159 
The new presence framework probed for what kind of activities were 
required for personal jurisdiction to be just.  As Judge Learned Hand put
it, the courts are “to inquire whether the extent and continuity of what
[the corporation] has done in the state in question makes it reasonable to 
bring it before one of its courts.”160 
The intuition here is that the corporation is represented by its agents in 
a forum.161  The actions of the agents on behalf of the company might 
establish a sufficiently deep and lasting connection to the forum that the 
nonresident corporation can be said to be “present” in the forum.162 
Because it is present, exercise over the nonresident corporation is largely
akin to the just exercise of jurisdiction over a resident corporation.163 
The trouble with the presence framework is its vagueness.  Just how 
much activity is required before a company is present?164  The most 
systematic way to give shape to the presence doctrine has been through 
determining whether the corporation was “doing business” within the 
state.165  But this formulation hardly improved matters.  Instead, it merely
led to a jumble of cases, recognizable to students of the modern personal
jurisdiction doctrine, about what activities amounted to doing business and 
159. Phila. & Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917) (“A foreign 
corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal liability, in the absence of 
consent, only if it is doing business within the State in such manner and to such extent as
to warrant the inference that it is present there.”).
160. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930). 
161. See, e.g., id. (“The shareholders, officers and agents are not individually the 
corporation, and do not carry it with them in all their legal transactions.  It is only when
engaged upon its affairs that they can be said to represent [the corporation] . . . .”). 
162. See, e.g., Tauza v Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 917–18 (N.Y. 1917)
(“Unless a foreign corporation is engaged in business within the state, it is not brought 
within the state by the presence of its agents.  But there is no precise test of the nature or 
extent of the business that must be done.  All that is requisite is that enough be done to 
enable us to say that the corporation is here.” (citations omitted)).
163. As many commentators point out, this glances over the home court advantage 
resident individuals—artificial and real—might have over present nonresidents.  See, e.g., 
Michael Landau & Donald E. Biederman, The Case for a Specialized Copyright Court: 
Eliminating the Jurisdictional Advantage, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 717, 784 (1999). 
164. See, e.g., Hutchinson, 45 F.2d at 141 (“It scarcely advances the argument to say that 
a corporation must be ‘present’ in the foreign state, if we define that word as demanding such
dealings as will subject it to jurisdiction, for then it does no more than put the question to
be answered.”).
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which were insufficient to constitute doing business in the forum.166  Judge 
Hand illustrates the exacerbation many felt with the presence/doing business
framework by noting that “[i]t is quite impossible to establish any rule
from the decided cases; we must step from tuft to tuft across the morass.”167 
D.  Justice as Minimum Contacts 
The Supreme Court, realizing the limitations of the notice, consent, and 
presence frameworks, attempted a new articulation in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington that focused on the “minimum contacts” necessary to
render the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation just.168 
Justice and due process, under the new minimum contacts test of personal 
jurisdiction, do no longer require that a defendant be “present within the 
territory of the forum.”169 Instead, for personal jurisdiction to be proper, the
defendant must “have certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that 
the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.’”170 
To determine if the defendant does so, courts would probe the “quality
and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of
the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.”171 
Justice “does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment
166. Id. at 141–42 (“Possibly the maintenance of a regular agency for the solicitation of
business will serve without more.  The answer made in Green v. C., B. & Q. R. R. Co., 
205 U.S. 530, 27 S. Ct. 595, 51 L. Ed. 916, and People’s Tob. Co. v. Amer. Tobacco 
Co., 246 U.S. 79, 38 S. Ct. 233, 62 L. Ed. 587, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 537, perhaps becomes 
somewhat doubtful in the light of International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 
34 S. Ct. 944, 58 L. Ed. 1479, and, if it still remains true, it readily yields to slight additions. 
In Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., supra, there was no more, but the business was continuous 
and substantial.  Purchases, though carried on regularly, are not enough (Rosenberg Co. 
v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 43 S. Ct. 170, 67 L. Ed. 372), nor are the activities of
subsidiary corporations (Peterson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 364, 27 S. Ct. 
513, 51 L. Ed. 841; Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 45 S. Ct. 
250, 69 L. Ed. 634), or of connecting carriers (Philadelphia & Read. Co. v. McKibbin, 
243 U.S. 264, 37 S. Ct. 280, 61 L. Ed. 710).  The maintenance of an office, though 
always a make-weight, and enough, when accompanied by continuous negotiation, to
settle claims (St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 33 S. Ct. 245, 57 L. Ed. 
486), is not of much significance (Davega, Inc., v. Lincoln Furniture Co., 29 F.(2d) 164
(C.C.A. 2)).”). 
167. Id. at 142. 
168. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
169. Id.
170. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 




























   
 
   
 
 
   
in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the
state has no contacts, ties, or relations.”172 
In this analysis, courts may include an “estimate of the inconveniences” 
to the defendant.173  Courts may thus exercise personal jurisdiction over
a defendant regardless of the defendant’s physical presence within the 
forum state’s territorial boundaries.174  Presence was no longer sufficient
or essential for jurisdiction.175 
Later cases refined the meaning of minimum contacts.  For personal 
jurisdiction to be proper under the minimum contacts analysis, “all 
assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the
standards [of fair play and substantial justice] set forth in International 
Shoe and its progeny.”176  Here, the court asks for the quantity and quality
of the defendant’s contacts with the forum,177 whether the defendant had
fair warning that she or he might be haled to that jurisdiction, whether the 
exercise of jurisdiction foreseeable,178 and to what extent the contacts
exhibited purpose.179  If the defendant’s contacts with the forum are
sufficiently continuous and systematic, then the state may justly exercise
general jurisdiction over any claim against the defendant, regardless of
where it arose.180  If the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are
isolated and sporadic, the state may exercise specific jurisdiction only over
claims that arise out of the defendant’s specific contacts with the forum 
state.181 
Next, the court asks whether the defendant can rebut the presumption
arising out of the minimum contacts analysis that the exercise of jurisdiction 
172. Id.
173. Id. at 317 (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d
Cir. 1930)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
174. See id. at 316–17. 
175. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211–12 (1977). 
176. Id. at 212. 
177. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)
(plurality opinion) (holding that merely placing an item into the stream of commerce is not 
purposeful enough). 
178. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
179. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (testing for purposeful 
availment of the benefits and protections of the forum state); see also Asahi, 480 U.S. at 
112 (“[A] defendant’s awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the 
product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the 
stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State.”).
180. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–16 
(1984).  General jurisdiction is also sometimes called “all-purpose jurisdiction.”  E.g., 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). 
181. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478–82 (1985) (concluding
that Florida had jurisdiction over the defendant in a contract dispute where the defendant 
performed actions related to the contract in Florida).  This type of personal jurisdiction is
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would be reasonable.182  A defendant can do so by arguing that the
assertion of jurisdiction is not in accordance with fair play and 
substantial justice.
E.  Justice to the Plaintiff, the Forum, and the Interstate System 
Shortly after International Shoe was decided, the Court expanded the 
justice analysis of the minimum contacts test.  Instead of merely asking 
whether the exercise of jurisdiction was just to the defendant, courts were 
now instructed to also examine additional factors that probed whether denial 
of jurisdiction would be just to the plaintiff. 
In Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Commission, 
the Supreme Court confronted the situation where it would be practically
prohibitive for the plaintiff to sue in the defendant’s distant forum.183  The 
Court noted the “unwisdom, unfairness and injustice of permitting
[plaintiffs] to seek redress only in some distant state where the [defendant] 
is incorporated,” concluding that “[t]he Due Process Clause does not forbid 
a state to protect its citizens from such injustice.”184 
Considerations of justice to the plaintiff are especially important where
“claims were small or moderate” so that “individual claimants frequently 
could not afford the cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum—thus in
effect making the company judgment proof.”185  “[T]he plaintiff’s interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief” has ever since been an important 
element for courts to weigh when determining whether the exercise of
jurisdiction is just or not.186 
Beyond examining the justice to the defendant and the plaintiff, courts 
have also emphasized that an exercise of jurisdiction must be just to the 
forum.  A denial of jurisdiction often amounts to a denial of a forum’s 
182. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). 
183. Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia. ex rel. State Corp. Comm’n, 339 U.S. 643, 
648–49 (1950) (“[I]f Virginia is without power to require this Association to accept service of
process on the Secretary of the Commonwealth, the only forum for injured certificate 
holders might be Nebraska. Health benefit claims are seldom so large that Virginia
policyholders could afford the expense and trouble of a Nebraska law suit.”). 
184. Id. at 649. 
185. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co. 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). 
186. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (citation













   
 
 
   
 
  







interest in regulating activity.187  The forum’s interests also implicate the
convenience of the trial location and the location of witnesses and
discovery material.188  Forum interests are to be considered on par with 
the interests of the defendant and the plaintiff.  All of these interests must be
balanced and considered for an exercise of jurisdiction to be just. 
A final consideration extends beyond the forum to the “interstate judicial 
system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; 
and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.”189  This includes an examination of “the Federal 
Government’s interest in its foreign relations policies.”190  Considerations
of justice thus range from the defendant, to the plaintiff, the forum, and 
indeed, the interstate system.
In all of these manifestations, the modern personal jurisdiction doctrine
probes whether an exercise of jurisdiction would be just.  Courts do not 
explicitly probe whether an exercise of jurisdiction would be legitimate— 
though there are resources in numerous opinions that are compatible with a
legitimacy analysis. 
Ideally, institutions and practices conform to notions of justice and
legitimacy.  The Court’s oversight of legitimacy is consequently troubling, 
if understandable.  As this Part demonstrated, courts have struggled
to account for evolving norms of corporate personhood in the context of
providing a test that is just to the defendant, the plaintiff, and the forum.
Courts have failed to recognize that corporate rights and responsibilities 
have evolved to the point where we can intelligently speak of corporate 
personhood.  This status as artificial persons has made political obligations 
and legitimacy a viable category for corporations that can serve to ground 
the personal jurisdiction analysis. 
IV. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS OF POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 
This Part argues that political rights and political obligations are 
intertwined.  As applied to corporations, any viable theory of political
obligation must consider the rights and freedoms a state grants to
187. See, e.g., Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 (noting “the interests of the forum State”); McGee, 
355 U.S. at 223 (“It cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest in providing 
effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims.”). 
188. E.g., Travelers Health Ass’n, 339 U.S. at 649 (“In addition, suits on alleged 
losses can be more conveniently tried in Virginia where witnesses would most likely live 
and where claims for losses would presumably be investigated.  Such factors have been
given great weight in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens.” (citation omitted)). 
189. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; see also Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985). 
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corporations before determining whether the corporation is obligated to 
submit to the adjudicatory power of the state.
To have a political obligation is to have a moral obligation to obey the
laws of one’s country and to submit to its jurisdiction. Political obligations
thus imply legal duties.  Without legitimate political obligation, a state’s 
exercise of power is arbitrary and coercive.  Conversely, a state’s exercise
of power is legitimate when grounded in a viable framework of political 
obligation. 
Legitimacy has important consequences for the operation and persistence
of a legal system.  A legal system that is founded upon and regulated by
legitimate principles of political obligation will be constrained and 
principled. Predictably, a legitimate legal system will be obeyed freely
by a greater percentage of the individuals subject to its jurisdiction.  Thus, 
legitimate legal systems are more efficient and more integrated into 
society.191 
The notion of political obligation can be used for two important purposes. 
First, it allows us to judge the legitimacy of a state.  Second, it functions 
as a measuring rod to test whether persons have a moral obligation to
obey the laws of a country and to submit to its jurisdiction even when
they desire to do otherwise. 
There are five main frameworks for analyzing political obligations:
(1) Actual and Tacit Consent, (2) Gratitude, (3) Membership, (4) Utility, 
and (5) Hypothetical Consent.192  All of these models, in their characteristic
ways, link rights to obligations. 
191. The empirical literature on these points is legion. See generally  TOM R. TYLER,
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 24–25 (1990) (asserting that individuals’ normative values 
and perceptions of the legitimacy of a given authority influence their decisions on
whether to comply with the law or not); Amy Gangl, Procedural Justice Theory and 
Evaluations of the Lawmaking Process, 25 POL. BEHAV. 119 (2003) (describing “the
conditions under which process variables matter as much or more than policy outcomes 
in individuals’ evaluations of the legitimacy of the lawmaking process”); Tom R. Tyler,
Procedural Justice, in  THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 435 (Austin 
Sarat ed., 2004) (reviewing psychological research on procedural justice).  For accounts
of procedural justice and the U.S. Supreme Court, see Jeffery J. Mondak, Perceived 
Legitimacy of Supreme Court Decisions: Three Functions of Source Credibility, 12 POL. 
BEHAV. 363 (1990), and Jeffery J. Mondak, Substantive and Procedural Aspects of Supreme 
Court Decisions as Determinants of Institutional Approval, 19 AM. POL. Q. 174 (1991). 
192. These frameworks embody distinct traditions.  However, there have been some
attempts to integrate them. See, e.g., Gerald Gaus, Justification, Choice, and Promise: Three 
Devices of the Consent Tradition in a Diverse Society, 15 CRITICAL REV. INT’L SOC. & 
POL. PHIL. 109 (2012) (attempting to “bring the Kantian and Lockean contract traditions 












    






   
   
   
 
    
 




This Part explains these five frameworks of political obligation.  It 
elaborates the sources and limitations of political obligations under each
of these five frameworks.  Next, it examines whether these frameworks,
originally developed for actual persons, can be applied to artificial entities 
like corporations.  Consent, gratitude, membership, and utility all fail at this
task.  The only viable choice is Kant’s hypothetical choice model of
political obligations.  Under the Kantian framework, the state is necessary
for the realization of corporate rights and freedoms.  Crucially, political
rights under a Kantian framework are conceptually dependent on political
obligations.  Out of this conceptual dependency arise political obligations 
for the bearers of these rights and freedoms, including submission to the
jurisdiction of the rights-granting state. 
A.  Consent 
In the liberal tradition, political obligations arise out of consent.  A person
takes on political obligations by consenting to the state’s exercise of
jurisdiction over him or her.  This act of consent must fulfill minimal
requirements to serve as a foundation of political and legal obligations.
To be binding, consent must be informed, expressed, and given freely.193 
Some theorists speak of this act of consenting as the creation of a
contract.  Consent theories are thus often referred to as social contract 
theories.  John Locke is arguably the most influential early social contract 
theorist.  His account of political obligations as grounded in consent 
serves as an important cornerstone of the liberal tradition.  Locke’s analysis
starts from the state of nature where individuals are not subject to any
binding political authority.194 No government exists in the state of nature,
801 (2004) (developing a “multiprinciple theory of political obligation, based on the 
principle of fairness, a natural duty of justice, and . . . the ‘common good’ principle”); 
Jonathan Wolff, Political Obligation: A Pluralistic Approach, in  PLURALISM: THE
PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS OF DIVERSITY 179 (Maria Baghramian & Attracta Ingram eds., 
2000) (accepting multiple theories of political obligation). 
193. These conditions are very complex.  For example, it is not clear just how much
information the truly consenting person requires or what conditions count as coercive. 
For an illustration of the complexities associated with consent, consider the test whether
consent to search by a police officer was voluntary or not.  See generally Florida v. Bostick,
501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991) (“‘Consent’ that is the product of official intimidation or 
harassment is not consent at all.”); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)
(“Our cases do not reflect an uncritical demand for a knowing and intelligent waiver in every
situation where a person has failed to invoke a constitutional protection.”). 
 194. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 4, at 4 (J.W. 
Gough ed., 1948) (1690) (“[The state of nature is a state] of equality, wherein all the power 
and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more
evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the 
same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one 
amongst another without subordination or subjection . . . .”). 
164
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and there is no overarching power that could legislate or adjudicate disputes.
The state of nature is thus marked by a great deal of freedom and
independence.195  However, Locke stresses that the state of nature is also
markedly inconvenient, most notably due to the absence of an overarching 
authority to adjudicate disputes.196  To overcome these inconveniences, 
individuals consent to the creation of an overarching political society.197 
Voluntary consent to this political society constitutes the foundation of the 
moral obligations individuals subsequently have.  Individuals become full 
members of the political society through their consent.  They voluntarily 
take on the burdens of political obligations, including submission to the 
adjudicatory jurisdiction of the state, and gain the benefits of escaping the
state of nature.198  Here as elsewhere, political obligations and political 
benefits are closely intertwined. 
1. Actual Consent 
Actual consent to political authority is an initially attractive theory of 
political obligation.199  It functions very much like a valid contract where
195. Id. (“[A]ll men are naturally in . . . a state of perfect freedom to order their 
actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds 
of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other 
man.”). 
196. The laws of nature govern in the state of nature.  They require that “no one 
ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.”  Id. § 6, at 5. Nonetheless,
some people transgress against the law of nature and “invad[e] others’ rights and . . . do[] 
hurt to one another.”  Id. § 7, at 5.  The law of nature, according to Locke, grants the
injured parties and their allies a right to recover from the offender as “every one has a 
right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation.” 
Id. § 7, at 5–6.  Such punishment should thus be “proportionate to [the] transgression.”  
Id. § 8, at 6.  However, people are poor judges in their own causes and will frequently
overestimate the amount of harm or damage suffered.  Passions will run high.  Excessive 
compensation will lead to ill will and potentially additional rounds of retribution. Id. 
§ 13, at 8, §§ 124–125, at 62–63.  Even if this was not the case, some people in the state
of nature may lack the power or opportunity to enforce their rights.  Id. § 123, at 62,
§ 126, at 63.  The lack of a way to settle disputes fairly and legitimately renders the state
of nature not insufferable—as in Hobbes—but sufficiently inconvenient to warrant a state that
has the overarching authority to adjudicate disputes. 
197. Id. § 13, at 8 (asserting that there are “inconveniences of the state of nature” 
for which Locke “easily grant[s] that civil government is the proper remedy”).
198. Nobody, according to Locke, may be forced to enter civil society.  Id. § 95, at 
48. Even if most people in a given territory chose to enter civil society, anybody may
abstain and retain his or her liberty in the state of nature, with the usual inconveniences 
and the added inconvenience of having an organized civil society next door. See id.
199. This is, in part, because of historical developments that oriented society towards









   
   
 
   
 
     
  
    




    
 
 
    
     





   
 
 
    
 
 
   
 
the parties promise to perform their sides of the bargain.200  Subsequent
to the promise, the parties are bound to terms of the contract.  Agreement to
these terms is a strong foundation of obligations.201  These obligations
are direct rather than subject to lengthy and tenuous deductions, establish a
meaningful relation between the individual and the political community, 
provide specific rather than general political obligations, and constitute 
sufficient conditions for the formation of a political society.202  Actual 
consent also makes it easy for members, nonmembers, and the state to 
tell who is subject to political obligations and who is not.  The mechanism 
for moving from nonmember to member is also simple and clear: a
manifestation of actual consent suffices.203 These features of actual consent 
make it an attractive candidate for grounding political obligation.204 
However, to be more than a candidate, there need to be actual instances of 
consent to the political authority of the state.  As applied to individuals,
actual consent, though attractive, is not realistic.  Most people in most 
times and most places simply do not provide actual consent to their
government.  The Oath of Allegiance that immigrants must take before 
they can become U.S. citizens is often taken to be one of the few exceptions 
to this rule.205  Numerous theorists claim it as one of the few instances
where individuals can be said to provide actual consent to the authority of
the state.206  However, this is somewhat puzzling as the text of the oath 
See, e.g., DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 1–2 (1989); C. 
B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE
9–106 (1962); Harro Höpfl & Martyn P. Thompson, The History of Contract as a Motif
in Political Thought, 84 AM. HIST. REV. 919, 919–31 (1979). 
200. I conflate here agreeing and promising.  Others treat them separately.
201. See A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 70–71
(1979) (“[T]he model of the promise lends clarity and credibility to a theory of political
obligation; for promising is surely as close to being an indisputable ground of moral
requirement as anything is.  Basing a theory of political obligation on consent, then, 
lends it plausibility unequaled by rival theories.”); see also MARGARET GILBERT, A THEORY
OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION: MEMBERSHIP, COMMITMENT, AND THE BONDS OF SOCIETY 59
(2006) (“[Agreements] may indeed be the most salient source of [direct] obligations, along
with promises.”).
 202. GILBERT, supra note 201, at 58–60. 
203. Id. at 60. 
204. But see Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory, supra note 117, at 17 
(“[C]onsent does not establish territorial sovereignty. . . .  If one’s obligation to obey one’s 
state depends on territorial sovereignty, the role consent plays becomes exceedingly thin.
Territoriality instead occupies the crucial role and consent arguments become superfluous.”). 
205. For the text of the oath, see Naturalization Oath of Allegiance to the United 
States of America, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/ 
site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=facd6db8d7e372
10VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=dd7ffe9dd4aa3210VgnVCM10000 
0b92ca60aRCRD (last updated Sept. 4, 2012). 
206. See, e.g., Rolf Sartorius, Political Authority and Political Obligation, 67 VA. 
L. REV. 3, 12–13 (1981) (“A sincere and freely given oath to uphold the Constitution is
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does not speak to general political obligations and lists only a few 
specific obligations.207  None of them are related to submitting to the
authority of the state to adjudicate disputes.  Actual consent as a theory of 
political obligations, for individuals, has few defenders.
The story is more complicated for corporations.  There, we must ask 
whether corporations as artificial persons ever consented to the authority 
of the state and whether such consent is sufficient to place political
obligations on corporations, thus making them subject to the jurisdiction of
the state.
The answer on the federal level is “no.”208  No federal statute requires
that corporations provide actual consent to the political authority of the 
state.  Perhaps this is not surprising, as there are few federally chartered
corporations.  Corporations are traditionally chartered and regulated
primarily by states.
States also do not require corporations to provide actual consent to the
general political authority of the state.  However, some states require
corporations to actually consent to the specific authority of the state to
exercise jurisdiction over them.209  Typically this is done as a condition of
may be taken as evidence that one both understands and endorses the claims of those in
power (and of those who will legitimately succeed them) to the right to rule.”); A. John 
Simmons, Consent, Free Choice, and Democratic Government, 18 GA. L. REV. 791, 796 
(1984) (“Perhaps the clearest candidates for the status of express consenter are naturalized
citizens, who typically must take an explicit oath of allegiance to the government or 
constitution of their new country.”).
207. See Naturalization Oath of Allegiance to the United States of America, 
supra note 205 (“I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and
abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, of 
whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend 
the Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign 
and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms
on behalf of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform noncombatant 
service in the armed forces of the United States when required by the law; that I will
perform work of national importance under civilian direction when required by the law; 
and that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion;
so help me God.”). 
208. This is in the sense that there is no systematic way in which corporations 
provide actual consent.  However, in individual actions corporations can consent to personal 
jurisdiction—lack of personal jurisdiction is waivable, lack of subject matter jurisdiction
is not. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (holding
that the plaintiff consented by contract); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67–68 (1938) 
(holding that the plaintiff consented to the court’s jurisdiction by filing suit).
209. See generally Matthew Kipp, Inferring Express Consent: The Paradox of
Permitting Registration Statutes To Confer General Jurisdiction, 9 REV. LITIG. 1, 9–16
(1990) (recounting the history and development of the corporate consent doctrine). 
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incorporation.  Another approach is to base the consent of a corporation to
jurisdiction on a two-step process.  First, the state imposes a statutory 
requirement on foreign companies to register with state authorities.210  As
a condition of this registration, a foreign company must then appoint an
agent in the state, thereby potentially creating sufficient contacts with the
forum for a valid exercise of jurisdiction.211  Even more tenuously, some 
states simply declare a state official to be an agent of a corporation upon 
whom valid process may be served.212  Registration, with or without the
appointment of an agent, is then taken by some states as an indicator of 
actual consent to jurisdiction. 
All states require foreign corporations to designate a local resident for 
process.  However, most states do not indicate that this registration entails 
consent to the jurisdiction of the state.213  Failure to register does not void 
contracts entered in that state, does not subject the corporation to prejudice 
in the state’s courts, and does not subject the foreign corporation to
penalties.214  Foreign corporations that did not register simply cannot sue
in state courts, but they can still be sued.215  Corporations thus consent to
something when they register with a state.  But it is not clear whether they
consent, based on this registration alone, to having courts in that state 
exercise personal jurisdiction over them.216  This distinction was lost on 
earlier courts that accepted registration alone as a sufficient basis for
210. See id. at 1 n.1 (collecting statutes); see, e.g., TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. 
§ 9.001(a) (West 2011) (“To transact business in this state, a foreign entity must register
under this chapter . . . .”); Irrevocable Consent to Jurisdiction of the Commissioner and
New Jersey Courts, N.J. DEPARTMENT OF BANKING & INS., http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/ 
division_insurance/pdfs/mwic.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2013). 
211. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 9.004 (West 2011) (“The [foreign 
filing entity’s registration] application must state . . . the address of the initial registered
office and the name and address of the initial registered agent for service of process that 
Chapter 5 requires to be maintained . . . .”).
212. E.g., id. § 5.251 (“The secretary of state is an agent for an entity for purposes
of services of process, notice, or demand on the entity if the entity is . . . a foreign filing
entity and the entity fails to appoint or does not maintain a registered agent in this state; 
or the registered agent of the entity cannot with reasonable diligence be found at the registered
office of the entity; or the entity is a foreign filing entity and the entity’s registration to
do business under this code is revoked; or the entity transacts business in this state without 
being registered as required by Chapter 9.”). 
213. For the importance of this distinction, see, for example, Shaffer v. Heitner, in 
which the Court notes that “Delaware, unlike some States, has not enacted a statute that
treats acceptance of a directorship as consent to jurisdiction in the State.” 433 U.S. 186,
216 (1977) (footnote omitted). 
214. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 383 (2011). 
215. See, e.g., id.
216. See, e.g., Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1110 (Del. 1988) (“The state and 
federal courts . . . are divided as to whether statutory registration can operate as an express 
consent to personal jurisdiction in the absence of ‘minimum contacts.’”).
168
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jurisdiction.217 Modern jurisprudence now generally holds that registration
alone is an insufficient ground for consent to jurisdiction.218 
Actual consent is thus undermined from multiple sides.  First, there is
often no attempt to ask for actual consent.219  Second, even where there are
hints of a question, it is not clear that the answer is sufficient to create
obligations.  Third, where there is actual consent, it often fails to 
create general political obligations. Fourth, the geographic scope of these 
obligations is narrow—typically confined to the one state.  Fifth, it is
entirely unclear under actual consent theory and applicable case law which 
corporate officer or corporate entity is conceptually capable of furnishing
217. See Pa. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 95 (1917); 
Smolik v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (accepting that
appointment of an agent for process constitutes actual consent to general jurisdiction). 
218. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (holding that 
valid exercise of jurisdiction must be based on the quality and nature of the defendant’s
contacts with the forum); Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 
183–84 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding against consent to personal jurisdiction on constitutional 
grounds); Leonard v. USA Petroleum Corp., 829 F. Supp. 882, 889 (S.D. Tex. 1993)
(holding that a corporation does not consent to jurisdiction merely by registering); see 
also William Laurens Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: A Current Account, 47 N.C.
L. REV. 733, 734 (1969) (“The only condition adopted by every state is that foreign 
corporations name local residents as their agents to accept process.  The piecemeal
overruling of Pennoyer and the consequent development of provisions for service of 
process on corporations outside forum jurisdictions have eliminated any jurisdictional 
reason to require local agents.” (footnote omitted)).  But cf. Conner v. ContiCarriers & 
Terminals, Inc., 944 S.W.2d 405, 409 (Tex. App. 1997) (plurality opinion) (examining 
whether “a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Chicago” had
consented to jurisdiction in Texas by registering to do business in the state); Goldman v. 
Pre-Fab Transit Co., 520 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (holding in favor of 
valid consent through registration).  See generally Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Clarifying
General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 807, 856–62 (2004) (describing courts’
evolving views on the significance of appointing an agent in personal jurisdiction analysis). 
219. This is the case, for example, for corporations chartered under federal law like 
the highly controversial Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  For additional examples, see 36 
U.S.C. §§ 10101–27010 (2006), which contains the corporate charters of over ninety
patriotic and national societies, including the Boy Scouts of America, the National 
Academy of Sciences, and the American Legion, and Hannah L. Buxbaum, Personal 
Jurisdiction over Foreign Directors in Cross-Border Securities Litigation, 35 J. CORP. L. 
71, 90–92 (2009), which notes the practical difficulties of requiring foreign directors to
consent to jurisdiction in U.S. courts for all claims arising out of their companies’
securities activity.  Commentators have also examined the context of actual consent of
individuals. See GEORGE KLOSKO, THE PRINCIPLE OF FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION
142 (1992) (“[R]elatively few individuals expressly consent to their governments.”); 
SIMMONS, supra note 201, at 79 (“The paucity of express consentors is painfully apparent.”);
M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation To Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L.J. 950, 
960 (1972–1973) (“[M]any persons have never so agreed [to assume the obligations of 
citizenship].”).
169
      
 















    
  
 
   
  
   
  
 
   
   
     
   
   
 
actual consent.220  Sixth, actual consent theory has difficulties dealing 
with dissenters and strategic holdouts.221 Seventh, corporations, under
current state law, can theoretically exist forever.  This raises the question
whether actual consent given at one time could create obligations forever or
whether intervening changes could alter or void the original grant of 
consent. 
Even for the few states that explicitly tie incorporation or registration
to consent and jurisdiction, the state’s authority to exercise jurisdiction is
still philosophically problematic.  For actual consent to create political
obligations, the act of giving must have been intentional, clear, based on 
premeditation, and voluntary, that is, noncoercive.222  State statutes and 
practices may fail on all of these counts.  For example, deeming a state
official an agent of the company if it should fail to designate its own
agent undermines claims to intentional, actual consent.  Many companies in
the Internet age simply do not register in a state to do business there, and 
even if they did, they might not appoint an agent or be aware that a state 
official can function as an agent in this situation.  Often, there simply is
no actual consent even in the few states that establish a viable framework 
for companies to consent.  And where there is some consent, it might not 
be sufficiently robust to create political obligations. 
As we have seen, actual consent could be a strong source of political
obligations but rarely is.223  People and companies rarely consent to political 
obligations. Even when they do, the conditions surrounding such consent 
might not satisfy conditions sufficient to count as voluntary and informed. 
Absent these conditions, consent, even where present, is insufficient to
create binding political obligations.  Worse still, even where there is actual, 
voluntary, and informed consent, such consent is often not broad enough
to serve as a robust backdrop of a state’s authority to exercise jurisdiction
224over a company. 
220. Only the C.E.O.?  Only the board?  Any corporate officer?  Or only those 
designated with this power?  Would actual consent necessarily fail if the corporation did 
not designate an agent with this power?
221. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 108–10 (1974). 
222. See GILBERT, supra note 201, at 64–67. 
223. In the context of individual political obligations, some scholars have suggested 
that people should be given well-structured opportunities to express consent and enter
relevant agreements. See, e.g., HARRY BERAN, THE CONSENT THEORY OF POLITICAL 
OBLIGATION (1987) (contending that political obligation “must rest on the actual personal 
consent of citizens”).  One could imagine a similar movement in the corporate context.
But see  JOHN HORTON, POLITICAL OBLIGATION 33–36 (1992) (questioning whether such
consent would be truly voluntary); GEORGE KLOSKO, POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 123–30 (2005) 
(same). 
224. See, e.g., Margaret Gilbert, Reconsidering the “Actual Contract” Theory 
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One way that scholars in other contexts have tried to deal with these 
objections is to give up on actual consent as a foundation of political 
obligations and to base such obligations in tacit consent instead. 
2. Tacit Consent 
Tacit consent theory accepts that people might not have given actual
consent to political obligations but holds that people’s enjoyment of benefits 
provided by the state can meaningfully be interpreted as constituting 
consent to political obligations to that state.225  Consent, under this
framework, can be indicated in ways other than expressly stating agreement. 
As in the usual law of contracts, parties may enter an agreement tacitly
under certain conditions.226 The resulting obligations of the parties are
still founded in consent.  However, the manifestation of that consent is not 
express but implied.  This raises the question of when we can reliably infer 
implied consent.  What conditions are sufficiently robust to allow us to 
claim that an entity has entered an agreement?227  Because entering such
an agreement binds a party to meaningful political obligations, the
conditions for tacit consent must be well-defined and restrictive.228 
Theorists vary widely on what number and what kinds of acts are
sufficient for tacit consent to create political obligations, including
submission to the authority of the state to adjudicate disputes.  Some
scholars think that participating in the electoral process, especially by
voting, is a sufficient indicator of tacit consent.229  Others focus on the
“active participation in the institutions of the state” as indicated by ordinary 
225. See generally A. John Simmons, Tacit Consent and Political Obligation, 5 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 274 (1976) (analyzing and explaining tacit consent). 
226. Silence is an example familiar from contract theory.  It also illustrates how 
restrictive the conditions must be in that everybody understands that mere silence will be 
taken as acceptance of a proposal. See, e.g., SIMMONS, supra note 201, at 79–82; Simmons, 
supra note 225, at 279–81. 
227. See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 194, § 119, at 60 (“Every man being, as has been 
shown, naturally free, and nothing being able to put him into subjection to any earthly
power but only his own consent, it is to be considered what shall be understood to be 
sufficient declaration of a man’s consent to make him subject to the laws of any
government. . . .  The difficulty is, what ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent, and
how far it binds—i.e., how far any one shall be looked on to have consented, and thereby
submitted to any government, where he has made no expressions of it at all.”). 
228. See, e.g., SIMMONS, supra note 201, at 79–82. 
229. See, e.g., J.P. PLAMENATZ, CONSENT, FREEDOM AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION 168–71
(2d ed. 1968) (arguing that people consent to a political system by voting and simply “by
taking part in its processes”). 
171
    
 
















     














activities such as sending children to public schools, using the public
library, and the like.230 
Locke, standing at the beginning of the tacit consent tradition, also
considered the issue of tacit consent.231  For him, tacit consent can easily 
be shown in two ways.  First, having any possessions in the territory of a 
government suffices, for Locke, as a sign of tacit consent to the government.
Locke provides the example of accepting inherited property to demonstrate
the broad reach of tacit consent.  Because the bequeather put the property 
permanently under the jurisdiction of the government, the bequeathed, 
by accepting the property, also tacitly accepts the government that governs 
the property.232 The second way, for Locke, to tacitly consent to a
government is through the “enjoyment of any part of the dominions of 
any government.”233  Locke’s examples are similarly broad: tacit consent 
is indicated by lodging in the country “only for a week” or by “barely 
travelling freely on the highway.”234  Given this broad definition, Locke
concludes that everybody within the territory of a state provides effective
tacit consent to its government.235 
Locke’s account is thus attractive because it potentially gives rise to
political obligations for virtually everybody.  However, Locke’s conditions 
for tacit consent are too broad.  Few people simply walking on a highway
would agree that this, by itself, is sufficient ground to morally bind them
 230. PETER J. STEINBERGER, THE IDEA OF THE STATE 218–20 (2004). 
231. Others locate the beginnings of the tacit consent tradition earlier in Hobbes. 
See, e.g., Issak I. Dore, Deconstructing and Reconstructing Hobbes, 72 LA. L. REV. 815, 
830 (2012); Ilya Somin, Revitalizing Consent, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 753, 760 n.20 
(2000).  Others still go back much further to Plato.  See, e.g., Leo P. Martinez, Taxes, 
Morals, and Legitimacy, 1994 BYU L. REV. 521, 530. 
 232. LOCKE, supra note 194, § 120, at 61 (“Whoever therefore from thenceforth by
inheritance, purchases, permission, or otherwise, enjoys any part of the land so annexed 
to, and under the government of that commonwealth, must take it with the condition it is 
under, that is, of submitting to the government of the commonwealth under whose 
jurisdiction it is as far forth as any subject of it.”).
233. Id. § 119, at 60. 
234. Id.  Similarly, some states provide that out-of-state motorists implicitly consent 
to the designation of an agent in the forum—typically the Secretary of State—that may 
be served.  See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356–57 (1927) (“[T]he State may
declare that the use of the highway by the non-resident is the equivalent of the
appointment of the registrar as agent on whom process may be served.”).  However, this 
avenue towards establishing personal jurisdiction is fairly narrow and typically applies
only with regard to vehicle accidents.  Earlier cases held that the consent needed to be
explicit and in advance.  Id. at 356 (“[I]n advance of the operation of a motor vehicle on
its highway by a non-resident, the State may require him to appoint one of its officials as 
his agent on whom process may be served in proceedings growing out of such use.”
(emphasis added) (citing Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 167 (1916))). 
 235. LOCKE, supra note 194, § 119, at 60 (stating that a political obligation arising
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to obey a government.236  As many have argued, by making his definition
of consent so broad, Locke makes it “almost unrecognizable.”237  Locke’s
theory of tacit consent, like many others, bases strong political obligations
on weak foundations.  This weakness in many accounts of tacit consent is
instructive: to provide a viable account of political obligations, the strength
of morally binding obligations must match equally strong conditions of 
tacit consent.  We might be willing to accept slightly ambiguous
expressions of tacit consent for minor political obligations.  But for strong 
political obligations, we require robust expressions of tacit consent that
give us confidence that the consent is meaningful. 
Therefore, we must ask whether corporations, as artificial persons, can
meaningfully be said to have provided tacit consent to meaningful political 
obligations in general and submission to the jurisdiction of a state in
particular.238 
Current personal jurisdiction doctrine asks a similar question.  It inquires
whether a defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with the forum 
state to warrant an exercise of specific jurisdiction. One of the ways to 
demonstrate such minimum contacts is through purposeful availment of 
the “benefits and protections” of a state.239  This language echoes Locke’s
claim that tacit consent can be indicated by “enjoyment of any part of the
dominions of any government.”240  Both build political obligations based on
236. See, e.g., DAVID HUME, Of the Original Contract, in THEORY OF POLITICS 193, 
203–04 (Frederick Watkins ed., 1951); A. JOHN SIMMONS, ON THE EDGE OF ANARCHY: 
LOCKE, CONSENT, AND THE LIMITS OF SOCIETY 69 (1993) (questioning whether merely
walking on the street or inheriting property is sufficient for “deliberate, voluntary alienation of
rights”); Simmons, supra note 225, at 289 (“Talk of consent in such situations can be no 
more than metaphorical.”).
 237. Hanna Pitkin, Obligation and Consent (pt. 1), 59 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 990, 995
(1965). 
238. Other states take a broader view and view incorporation as a tacit consent to
the jurisdiction of the state.  See, e.g., Rose v. Granite City Police Dep’t, 813 F. Supp 
319, 321 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (“The Court lacks jurisdiction over Defendants . . . .  The 
[defendants] are not incorporated or formed under the laws . . . of Pennsylvania . . . .”).
239. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (“[I]t is essential in
each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.”).  Some of the other ways of establishing minimum contacts are 
through purposefully directing activities at the forum state, especially dangerous ones, 
see, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985), purposefully
directing activities outside the forum state that had consequences in the forum state, see, 
e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 223 (1977), or initiating relationships with the
forum state, see, e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473. 





















   
 














tacit consent as indicated by enjoying the benefits of a well-ordered
political society.241  Enjoying the benefits of the rule of law and police
protection—and all other government benefits—is beneficial and
indispensable for many types of interactions.  Accepting these benefits
might thus be a sign of tacit consent to the political authority of the state.
A robust reliance on the benefits and protections of a state can count,
under this line of cases and Lockian reasoning, as a tacit acceptance of 
specific political obligations, most centrally submission to the authority of
the state to adjudicate disputes. 
Incorporation, under some theories of the corporation, is one way to
accept the benefits and protections of a state.  Predictably, some states
take the view that incorporation alone is sufficient tacit consent to the
jurisdiction of the state.242  However, courts do not count everything as
an act of tacit consent.  For example, merely placing an item into the stream 
of commerce is not sufficient to count as accepting such benefits and
protections.243 The doctrine on this question thus recognizes that an entity
can make use of a forum without tacitly consenting to its jurisdiction.
Just what counts as sufficient enjoyment of the benefits and protections of
a state to count as tacit consent to jurisdiction is fiercely debated.  However, 
independent of where this line is drawn, there is a structural problem
with this line of reasoning.  Accepting the benefits and protections of a state 
might imply consent, but these are not definitive signs of consent.244 
People, artificial and real, can enjoy the benefits and protections of a state
without intending to signify consent.
Of course, we could simply say that one may not accept the benefits and 
protections of a state without also accepting political obligations.  However, 
there is no mechanism, legal or otherwise, that makes this all-important 
demand.  Thus, enjoying the benefits and protections of a state may imply 
241. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882) (“If a State permits a 
foreign corporation to do business within her limits, and at the same time provides that in 
suits against it for business there done, process shall be served upon its agents, the 
provision is to be deemed a condition of the permission; and corporations that 
subsequently do business in the State are to be deemed to assent to such condition as 
fully as though they had specially authorized their agents to receive service of the 
process.”).
242. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.711 (West 1996) (“The existence of
any of the following relationships between a corporation and the state shall constitute a 
sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable the courts of record of this state to exercise
general personal jurisdiction over the corporation and to enable such courts to render 
personal judgments against the corporation.  (1) Incorporation under the laws of this
state.”).
243. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality
opinion) (“[A] defendant’s awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep 
the product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the product into
the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State.”).
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consent, but there is no way to make sure that tacit consent is indeed 
provided. Consent-implying enjoyments are not necessarily genuine
consensual acts.245  There is no reason to think that they are and no way 
to know for sure.  Obligations for corporations, arising from enjoyments of 
state benefits, thus cannot be grounded in the principle of tacit consent.246 
B.  Membership 
Given the practical and conceptual limitations of actual and tacit consent
theory, many theorists look to ground political obligations beyond the 
paradigm of consent.  One of these attempts builds upon the intuition 
that individuals have political obligations as members of a political
community.247  Under this theory, membership and association, not consent, 
are the bedrock of political obligations.248  Typically, membership is not 
coercively imposed on individuals.  Instead, it is simply the result of being 
born in a particular place at a particular time.  Membership in a group
creates the obligation to comply with the norms that govern it.  Individuals 
who acknowledge membership in the group must acknowledge the general 
obligation to obey the laws of the group.  This theory is thus referred to 
as the “membership” or “associative” theory.249 
Theorists in this relatively new framework often analogize the associative
approach of political obligations to family obligations.  Both, so the
argument goes, create and are defined by nonvoluntary obligations.250 
People are born into families just as they are born into political 
communities.  The obligations arising out of membership in a family, 
like the obligations arising out of the membership in a political community, 
constitute the member and the group. The obligations define the group,
245. Id. at 288. 
246. Our strong intuitions about them may instead be grounded in considerations of
fairness, gratitude, or fair play.  See, e.g., A.D.M. Walker, Political Obligation and the 
Argument from Gratitude, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 191, 210–11 (1988). 
247. See generally John Horton, In Defence of Associative Political Obligations
(pts. 1 & 2), 54 POL. STUD. 427 (2006), 55 POL. STUD. 1 (2007) (defending the idea of 
associative political obligations).
248. See, e.g., YAEL TAMIR, LIBERAL NATIONALISM 137 (1993) (“[T]he true essence 
of associative obligations [is that they] are not grounded on consent, reciprocity, or 
gratitude, but rather on a feeling of belonging or connectedness.”). 
249. See generally Leslie Green, Associative Obligations and the State, in DWORKIN 
AND HIS CRITICS 267 (Justine Burley ed., 2004).
250. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 206 (1986) (“Political association,
like family and friendship and other forms of association more local and intimate, is in 
itself pregnant of obligation.”).
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whether it is a family or a political community.  Without them there would 
be no sense of self-identity or self-understanding.  The group and the 
individual cannot be understood apart from and beyond the obligations 
that are intrinsic to membership.251  Because these relationships and
obligations are fundamental to our sense of who we are, they are beyond 
the reach of moral theories.252 
In an older line of cases, the Supreme Court has used the paradigm of 
obligations arising out of membership in contexts other than personal 
jurisdiction.  For example, in Blackmer v. United States, the Court held that
membership in a political community is an adequate basis for the assertion 
of coercive state authority.253  In Blackmer, Congress had subpoenaed a
U.S. citizen living abroad who challenged Congress’s authority to do so.254 
The Court held that Blackmer was obligated to obey Congress’s command 
based on his membership in the political community.255  The Supreme 
Court explained: 
While it appears that the petitioner removed his residence to France in the year
1924, it is undisputed that he was, and continued to be, a citizen of the United 
States.  He continued to owe allegiance to the United States.  By virtue of the 
obligations of citizenship, the United States maintained its authority over him,
and he was bound by its laws made applicable to him in a foreign country.256 
Numerous theorists have attacked the philosophical foundations 
of membership theory.257  Some critics point out that membership theory 
fails to provide moral foundations for political obligations.258  At best, it
is a descriptive account of why many people feel a sense of identity and
obligation.  But it cannot explain why people should feel that way.  The 
analogy between the political community and the family does not help on
this point.  It is neither a persuasive nor attractive theory of political
obligations. Modern political communities simply lack the intimate
relationship of families, and extending the paradigm of the family to entire
nations harbors the danger of political paternalism.  Similarly, the
251. See Michael O. Hardimon, Role Obligations, 91 J. PHIL. 333, 347 (1994)
(highlighting the role of “noncontractual role obligation[s]” that flow from “roles into 
which we are born”). 
252. See, e.g., HORTON, supra note 223, at 150–51. 
 253. 284 U.S. 421, 436–37 (1932). See generally Lea Brilmayer, Jurisdictional Due
Process and Political Theory, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 293, 301–02 (1987). 
254. Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 433. 
255. Id. at 443. 
256. Id. at 436. 
257. See generally Richard Dagger, Membership, Fair Play, and Political Obligation, 
48 POL. STUD. 104 (2000) (asserting that the fair play theory is superior to the associative 
theory of political obligation); Christopher Heath Wellman, Associative Allegiances and 
Political Obligations, 23 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 181 (1997) (addressing critically the 
associative theory of political obligation).
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membership theory of political obligations does not provide resources 
to resist group policies that are unjust, exploitative, or immoral.  If 
membership itself is enough to create moral obligations, then members 
are bound to the group’s policies, both moral and immoral. 
The membership theory of political obligations thus suffers from general
shortcomings.  Beyond these foundational shortcomings, it also is not
able to generate political obligations for corporations.  The analogy between
families and political communities, already troublesome for individuals, 
is even less attractive for corporations because they are not born into a
group but are consciously created in a specific forum.  In contrast to
individuals, corporations do not need to exist, do not need to act in a
particular forum, or could cease altogether.  They are not natural members
of the political community just as they are not members of a natural 
family. 
Membership theory, in short, is unattractive philosophically and
inapplicable to corporations.  It is unable to generate political obligations 
for corporations. 
C.  Gratitude 
Besides membership, gratitude is another conceptual foundation upon 
which political theorists have attempted to build solid political
obligations.259  According to this tradition, citizens owe a debt of gratitude
to the state for the benefits the state provides.  This debt of gratitude is
then supposed to be repaid through a sense of political obligation in general
and submission to the jurisdiction of the state in particular.  Theories of
gratitude differ from consent theories of political obligations because 
gratitude is owed whether benefits are accepted or merely received.260 
As applied to corporations, this account suggests that corporations
should feel a sense of gratitude for the benefits the state provides, for 
example, roads that can be used for commerce.  However, there are a
number of important difficulties with this theoretical framework.  First, 
gratitude is a human emotion.  As such, it is not clear that an artificial
person like a corporation could feel such an emotion or that it would make
259. See generally George Klosko, Political Obligation and Gratitude, 18 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 352 (1989); A.D.M. Walker, Obligations of Gratitude and Political Obligation, 18 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 359 (1989); Walker, supra note 246. 
260. This avoids the inability of tacit consent theorists to distinguish between 




















    
  
 
    
  
   
   
 
sense to suggest that it should act on it.  Second, gratitude is usually 
owed only to a benefactor who makes a “special effort or sacrifice.”261 
We do not owe gratitude to the salesperson for providing us with milk; 
we owe that person payment.  Similarly, a corporation might receive
benefits from the state, but that, at best, creates an obligation to pay taxes, 
not to submit to the jurisdiction of the state.  The state did not sacrifice
for the corporation—or for the individual taxpayer for that matter—and
gratitude would thus be misplaced.  Furthermore, benefactors who are 
motivated by self-interest are not owed gratitude. This implies that a
government that provides services and benefits for selfish reasons—for 
example, only to win the next election—is not owed gratitude.  Third, an 
account that builds political obligations on a debt of gratitude has difficulties
defining how this debt must be repaid.  Submission to the jurisdiction of 
the state might be one way to repay a debt, but there are many others. 
A corporation could easily and persuasively argue that, assuming it does
owe a debt of gratitude, it is repaying this debt by employing citizens, 
paying stock dividends, and creating wealth.  The state cannot define the 
manner in which an alleged debt of gratitude must be repaid because, as
Simmons points out, “benefactors are not specially entitled to themselves 
specify what shall constitute a fitting return for their benefaction.”262 
Gratitude, in short, is a thin foundation for political obligations, especially 
for corporations. 
D.  Utility 
Utilitarianism is another framework for political obligations.  In contrast
to most other theories of obligations, it is forward-looking rather than 
backward-looking.  Under this framework, political obligations are justified 
by the future utility derived from obeying the commands of the state,
rather than being justified by what the state or citizens did in the past.263 
Speaking broadly, utilitarians argue that we should judge actions by the 
degree to which they maximize utility. Actors should strive to maximize 
the net sum of utility in society, as measured, typically, by an aggregate
quantification of happiness or well-being. Political obligations derive from
this conceptual framework as well: because submitting to the jurisdiction
 261. SIMMONS, supra note 201, at 170. 
262. A. John Simmons, Political Obligation and Authority, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE
TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 17, 34 (Robert L. Simon ed., 2002). 
263. See generally ROLF E. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT AND SOCIAL NORMS:
A UTILITARIAN ACCOUNT OF SOCIAL UNION AND THE RULE OF LAW 81–115 (1975) (examining
obligations and political associations); R.M. Hare, Political Obligation, in SOCIAL ENDS 
AND POLITICAL MEANS 1 (Ted Honderich ed., 1976) (examining the political obligations 
of citizens to their countries).  But notice that Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, the 
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of the state produces more overall happiness than not submitting to the 
jurisdiction of the state, persons, artificial and real, have a moral duty to 
obey, even where they personally experience disutility. 
The utilitarian framework is open to a broad range of critiques.  Utility 
is difficult or perhaps impossible to measure, revealed utility devices suffer 
numerous shortcomings, and one cannot compare utility among actors.
Beyond these general critiques, it is also an empirical question whether 
overall utility is in fact increased if a corporation submits to the jurisdiction 
of a state or whether the specific harm occurred, say to employees and
shareholders, is actually greater than broad benefits to the public, for
example, in having a vibrant tort enforcement regime. 
More troubling still, utilitarianism has difficulties generating and 
sustaining adherence to obligations.264  If the guiding principle is to
maximize utility, then obligations have little or no binding force.  After 
all, utility could change or calculations could be redone, and actors might
find that the obligations that they had a minute ago no longer have any
hold over them.  The question whether a corporation should submit to the 
jurisdiction of a particular state is settled by considering the greatest
happiness of the greatest number, not by determining whether the
corporation incurred a political obligation.  Talk of political obligations
simply adds nothing to the utilitarian framework.  All questions of 
obligations are reduced to questions of justice.265 
E.  Hypothetical Consent 
Hypothetical consent is the only viable remaining theory of political
obligations for corporations.  Its foundation lies in an appreciation that 
the state is necessary for the realization of freedom, rights, and justice.
Under this framework, artificial and real persons acquire political 
obligations because they would have agreed to take on these obligations, if
asked, in order to secure these rights and freedoms.
One of the cornerstones of this tradition is Immanuel Kant.  For Kant, 
as for Locke, all persons possess innate freedom and rights.266  These 
264. See generally HORTON, supra note 223, at 63–69; SIMMONS, supra note 201, at 45– 
54. 
265. Resort to rule utilitarianism does little to change this structural feature of utilitarian
thought. 
266. This includes property rights. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS 
OF MORALS 63 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1785). 
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rights, however, cannot be given effect except in civil society.267  Without a
state, these rights are of little value and cannot contribute to human
flourishing.  Rights cannot be enforced except by a “competent judge” 
capable of “render[ing] a decision having the force of law.”268  For Kant,
this gives rise to an obligation to accept membership in civil society, respect 
the rights of others, and accept political obligations.269  Reciprocal freedom
is possible only under the law.  Without the authority of the state to arbitrate
disputes, nobody can enjoy one’s rights.  The state, in short, is necessary
for the realization of freedom and rights.
Given this important role, individuals are under a moral obligation to 
enter civil society and accept the duties society imposes.270  Each person 
therefore has compelling reasons to endorse the existence of the state, as
the state is “necess[ary] for the realization of freedom and rights and 
justice.”271  If asked, a reasonable person would accept the political 
obligations imposed by civil society, including, importantly, submission 
to the adjudicatory power of the state. 
The Kantian logic thus aims to discover “a way to justify a political 
system to everyone who is required to live under it.”272  These justifications
are the foundations of political legitimacy for the state and political
obligations for the subject.  Appealing to the ends and values of these 
subjects, a Kantian account of political obligations binds people based
on their own interest in establishing and maintaining a political framework
conducive to individual freedom, rights, and justice. 
Of course, real persons, if asked whether they will take on political
obligations to further these ends, will often be inclined to answer
 267. IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: PART I OF THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 116 (John Ladd trans., 2d ed. 1999) (“Although experience
teaches us that human beings live in violence and are prone to fight one another before 
the advent of external compulsive legislation, it is not experience that makes public 
lawful coercion necessary.  The necessity of public lawful coercion does not rest on a 
fact, but on an a priori Idea of reason, for, even if we imagine them to be ever so good 
natured and righteous before a public lawful state of society is established, individuals, 
nations, and states can never be certain that they are secure against violence from one 
another, because each will have his own right to do what seems just and good to him,
entirely independently of the opinion of others.”).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 114–15 (arguing that individuals are obligated to abandon the “state of
nature” and enter into a “juridical state of affairs”); KANT, supra note 266, at 85–87, 
123–24 (arguing that only under the coercive law of the state is “everyone . . . able to enjoy
his rights” (emphasis omitted)).
 270. IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 93, 98 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 2d ed.1991) (arguing that a person
who refuses to join political society would “rob[] me of . . . security and injure[] me by
virtue of this very state in which he coexits with me”).
 271. SIMMONS, supra note 121, at 140. 
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untruthfully.  They might do so hoping to dodge their obligations while 
reaping the generalized rewards of an orderly and just political society.
They might also answer based on misguided short-term assessments,
unfounded emotions, or other flawed reasoning.  The Kantian account, 
as such, does not ask for their actual or tacit consent.273  Instead, the Kantian 
process of justification relies on the hypothetical consent of idealized
persons.274  These idealized persons, properly situated, accept the reasons
for political obligations.  Kantians take this as indicative that actual persons
should aspire to accept these political obligations as well. 
Kantians thus ask under what conditions a rational actor, given the actor’s
ends and values, would endorse the existence of the state and accept the
political obligations this entails.  For individuals, this analysis is rife
with complications.275  However, for corporations the analysis is easier. 
Although any one particular corporation might be complicated, the idea
of the corporation is less ambiguous.  Corporations are businesses that, in
part, seek to maximize their profits.  They tend to succeed at this endeavor 
where a system of laws and regulations structures commerce efficiently.
For example, efficient corporations are hard to imagine without the law of
contracts and a set of competent courts to declare contracts valid and
enforce them.  The ends and values of corporations are thus predictably 
less diverse than the ends and values of actual persons.  Similarly, the 
rationality and deliberative capacity of corporations is more observable 
and clear.  It is more observable because it is enacted among actual people.
The rational capacity of corporations is clearer because they must choose 
means for only a limited number of ends—again, most centrally, economic 
efficiency.  For these reasons, it is possible to justify to corporations why 
they depend on the state. 
273. See, e.g., SIMMONS, supra note 121, at 147 (“Appeals to hypothetical choice, 
acceptability, or reasonable nonrejectablity have a very different moral basis and force 
than do appeals to actual choice . . . . Even appeals to what ought to be chosen in light of 
the individual’s own interests and values are quite different in force from appeals to that 
individual’s actual choices.”). 
274. With regard to actual persons, the extent of idealization is subject to much
debate.  More idealized individuals are more likely to accept political obligations but also
resemble actual individuals less and less. Conversely, less idealized individuals have
difficulties generating robust political obligations but resemble living and breathing 
individuals more. 
275. See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 101 (1989) 
(noting, for good and bad, that sex is a morally arbitrary characteristic and would not be 











     









   








Thus, the Kantian framework provides justifications to a corporation why 
it is better off with a political society in place that bestows rights and 
freedoms but that also imposes political obligations on everybody, including
the corporation itself.  Corporations, because they have a significant interest
in the existence of a viable state and a viable court system, must under 
this framework accept the political obligations that are the corollary to 
these rights and freedoms.
V. RECONNECTING RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS: PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION RECONSTRUCTED
This Part explores the implications of recognizing that political rights 
and political obligations are inherently intertwined.  It reconstructs current 
personal jurisdiction doctrine to account for the political rights and political
obligations of corporations.  This does not entail discarding the old personal 
jurisdiction doctrine.  The current doctrine rightly probes whether 
the imposition of jurisdiction in a particular case would be just. It asks
whether an exercise of jurisdiction would offend “traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.”276 
In making this determination, courts examine the defendant’s contacts 
with the forum, including the defendant’s past conduct with regard to the
case at hand,277 the burden on the defendant,278 the interests of the forum
state,279 an “estimate of the inconveniences” to the defendant from trial in
the forum,280 the forum’s interest in regulating the defendant’s conduct and
the location of witnesses,281 the defendant’s purposeful availment of the
forum,282 the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief,283 the “interstate
judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 
controversies[,] and the shared interest of the several States in furthering 
fundamental substantive social policies.”284  All of these factors test whether 
the imposition or denial of jurisdiction would be just to the defendant, the
276. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (emphasis added) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
277. Id. at 313–15, 320 (identifying that relevant “activities” included both the 
renting of property in the forum and employing forum residents). 
278. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1980). 
279. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). 
280. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 
F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
281. Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm’n, 339 U.S. 643, 
648–49 (1950). 
282. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
283. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (“A court
must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the 
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief.”). 
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plaintiff, or the forum.  The main thrust of the modern regime is thus on 
the justice of imposing jurisdiction.  It leaves aside whether the imposition 
of jurisdiction would be legitimate.
Justice and legitimacy, as we have seen, are two distinct concepts.285 
However, the current personal jurisdiction doctrine is exclusively focused 
on justice and completely neglects questions of legitimacy.  This is an
unnecessary oversight.  Legitimacy, as we have seen, depends on 
connecting political obligations with political rights.  Without legitimate 
political obligations, the state’s exercise of power, including the power 
of its courts, is arbitrary and coercive.  However, when such an exercise
of power is grounded in a compelling framework of political obligations, 
it becomes legitimate.
Courts should thus not only ask whether the imposition of personal 
jurisdiction is just but also whether it is legitimate.  To do so, they must
include in their minimum contacts test an analysis of the political
obligations and political rights of the defendant.  In the case of artificial
persons, the availability of these rights and obligations fluctuate with time
and place, and the use of these rights fluctuates with each individual
corporation.  These fluctuations are relevant to determinations whether 
the imposition of jurisdiction is legitimate in a given case.
This Part reconstructs personal jurisdiction doctrine along these lines. 
It argues that the current doctrine must supplement prongs that test for 
the justice of imposing jurisdiction with an alternative prong that tests for
the legitimacy of imposing jurisdiction.  To do so, courts must inquire into
the political obligations and political rights of corporate defendants. 
The Supreme Court has articulated two theories for establishing personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant based on contacts unrelated and related to
the suit at hand, called general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction, 
respectively.286 This Part explains how the general and specific jurisdiction
doctrines can and should be enriched by analyzing the political rights 
and freedoms of artificial persons. 
285. See supra Part III. 
286. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853– 
54 (2011); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413–16
(1984); see also Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. U.S. Kids, Inc., 22 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(“‘Specific jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction over causes of action arising from or related 
to a defendant’s actions within the forum state,’ while ‘[g]eneral jurisdiction . . . refers to
the power of a state to adjudicate any cause of action involving a particular defendant, 
regardless of where the cause of action arose.’” (quoting Sondergard v. Miles, Inc., 985
F.2d 1389, 1392 (8th Cir. 1993))). 
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A.  General Jurisdiction 
General jurisdiction tests whether the defendant has established a
“presence” in the forum through “continuous and systematic” activity
with the forum.287  These general contacts do not have to relate to the
subject of the suit for purposes of establishing general jurisdiction.  If a
defendant’s contacts with the forum state are sufficiently continuous and 
systematic, a court may exercise general jurisdiction over any action 
brought against that defendant, regardless of whether the action is related
to the forum contacts.288  General jurisdiction is thus “dispute-blind.”289 
Instead of focusing on the dispute-related activities of the defendant, it 
examines the defendant’s relation to the forum in a broader context.  How 
broad this context can be is unclear.  A recent Supreme Court decision290 
adds to the only two other decisions that directly address the issue of general 
jurisdiction.291 These three cases provide only examples of what does or 
does not amount to sufficient contacts for general jurisdiction, but they
do not provide a formal test.292 
Courts and commentators have struggled to define the types and number 
of activities that courts should consider when making general jurisdiction
determinations.  As applied to corporate defendants, commentators have 
focused on a variety of factors, including the location of corporate offices in
the forum,293 the presence of “branch” facilities,294 whether the corporation 
287. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414–16; see also Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining
Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447–48 (1952) (finding general jurisdiction over a Philippine mining 
company with operations in Ohio).
288. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414. 
 289. Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 612
(1988). 
290. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 (“Measured against Helicopteros and Perkins, 
North Carolina is not a forum in which it would be permissible to subject petitioners to 
general jurisdiction.  Unlike the defendant in Perkins, whose sole wartime business 
activity was conducted in Ohio, petitioners are in no sense at home in North Carolina. 
Their attenuated connections to the State . . . fall far short of the ‘the continuous and
systematic general business contacts’ necessary to empower North Carolina to entertain 
suit against them on claims unrelated to anything that connects them to the State.” 
(citation omitted) (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416)).
291. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 413–16; Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447–48; see also
Brilmayer et al., A General Look, supra note 117, at 724 (“These are the only two 
Supreme Court cases addressing the issue of general jurisdiction since 1952.”).
292. See, e.g., LSI Indus. Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (“Neither the United States Supreme Court nor this court has outlined a 
specific test to follow when analyzing whether a defendant’s activities within a state are 
‘continuous and systematic.’”). 
 293. B. Glenn George, In Search of General Jurisdiction, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1097, 1129
(1990). 
 294. Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL
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“adopts” the forum as its sovereign,295 the place of incorporation,296 and 
whether the corporation shapes its corporate policy in the forum or conducts 
core activities in the forum.297  Continuous, systematic, and substantial
business activities used to be considered sufficient for a finding of general 
jurisdiction, but are no more.298  No scholarship has yet considered the
political rights and freedoms of a corporation when determining the
contours of general jurisdiction.299 
This is an unnecessary blind spot.  The state is necessary, as we have 
seen, for the meaningful realization of freedoms, rights, and justice.
Corporations acquire political obligations because they would have agreed,
if asked, to take on political obligations in order to secure political
freedoms.  Included in the realm of these political obligations is the duty 
to submit to the jurisdiction of the forum’s courts.  Under the Kantian
framework of political obligations, the existence, exercise, and enjoyment
of political rights provide strong reasons why a corporation, again, if 
asked, would agree to take on political obligations.  It is a good trade based 
on the corporation’s own interests in establishing and maintaining a 
political framework conducive to freedoms and justice.  The corporation, 
given its ends and values, would endorse the existence of the state and 
accept the political obligations this entails.  Of course, if asked about a 
particular case, the corporation might be tempted to deny this link between 
political rights and political obligations.  This situation baffles actual
consent theorists.300  However, it is of little concern to hypothetical consent
theorists because they inquire what a properly situated corporation would 
answer, not what it actually answered in any given case.301 
 295. Stein, supra  note 117, at 758 (noting that adopting a forum entails treating a forum 
as the corporation’s home for most purposes). 
 296. Brilmayer et al., A General Look, supra note 117, at 733–34. 
297. Sarah R. Cebik, “A Riddle Wrapped in a Mystery Inside an Enigma”: General
Personal Jurisdiction and Notions of Sovereignty, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1, 36. 
298. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2856
(2011) (rejecting the “sprawling view” of general jurisdiction under which “any substantial 
manufacturer or seller of goods would be amenable to suit, on any claim for relief,
wherever its products are distributed”).
299. The closest mention that I am aware of is found in Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts
Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 87, 
which notes that “[s]ystematic unrelated activity, such as domicile, incorporation, or 
doing business, suggests that the person or corporate entity is enough of an ‘insider’ that 
he may safely be relegated to the State’s political processes.”
300. See supra notes 219–24 and accompanying text. 





















    
 
The existence, use, and enjoyment of political rights are thus a good 
foundation for imposing general personal jurisdiction.  Courts should 
consider the exercise of political rights as evidence that a corporation had a
sustained interest in the forum sufficient for the corporation to take on
the task of trying to influence the forum’s policy. For example, corporate 
expenditures in support of independent political broadcasts in candidate 
elections, now legal under Citizens United,302 indicate a strong connection 
and interest in the forum that might be sufficient for the imposition of 
general jurisdiction. 
Similarly, invocation of political speech rights and negative speech
rights speak to the interest a corporation has in protecting itself and 
furthering its own goals through political rights.  Where a corporation 
invokes these rights in a particular forum, it establishes a connection to 
the forum that should make it easier for a court to find general jurisdiction,
just as the presence of additional corporate offices in the forum makes 
the imposition of general jurisdiction more likely.
Finally, where corporations invoke the protection of the Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendments in a given forum, they demonstrate that they
enjoy and use rights in that forum.  Use of these rights in a particular forum 
is evidence that the corporation has a general, non-dispute-specific 
connection to the forum.  Such a connection, again, will push the
corporation’s contacts across the threshold toward a finding of general 
jurisdiction. 
How politically active a corporation is in a forum thus constitutes 
evidence of the corporation’s interest in the forum and connections with
the forum.  Such an analysis is attentive to the increased rights afforded 
to domestic corporations and those denied to foreign corporations.303 It 
is also dynamic across time with the expansion and restriction of
constitutional rights.  Similarly, this approach is also attentive to variations 
among states depending on the political rights granted to corporations in 
these states. Finally, an analysis of the enjoyment and uses of political
rights is attentive to variation between different corporations.  For example, 
small out-of-state Internet sellers are not likely to invoke political 
protections or utilize rights to influence the political process, and these 
factors should speak against a finding of general jurisdiction.  In contrast, a
corporation that repeatedly invokes political protections and seeks to
influence political representatives and the forum’s policy should not be 
allowed to claim that it does not have sufficient contacts with the forum 
302. 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010). 
 303. Under Citizen United only domestic corporations are currently permitted to
contribute to issue campaigns. See id. at 911 (declining to address the government’s interest 
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to find general jurisdiction.  Use of political rights, in this context, can 
substitute for the presence of corporate offices or branch facilities.  Courts 
should not simply disregard this readily available information but rather 
incorporate it into their general jurisdiction analysis. 
B.  Specific Jurisdiction 
Specific jurisdiction tests whether the claims of the specific case before
the court “arise out of” or “relate to” the defendant’s activity in the forum.304 
A court has specific jurisdiction over a nonconsenting defendant only 
“with respect to issues deriving from, or connected with, the very
controversy that establishes jurisdiction to adjudicate.”305  Wherever a
court claims adjudicatory power over a defendant based on the defendant’s 
forum activities that were related to the suit, the court invokes specific 
jurisdiction.  The boundaries of the analysis are thus defined by the specific
dispute before the court.  A defendant’s general relationship with the forum,
apart from and beyond connections with activities that gave rise to the 
suit at hand, is irrelevant for a finding of specific jurisdiction.  Specific 
jurisdiction is appropriate where a court can find a sufficiently strong
connection between the defendant’s activities in the forum and the
asserted causes of action. 
Courts have developed a long, but not exhaustive, list of factors that 
probe for the strength of that connection.  Courts consider the defendant’s 
past conduct with regard to the case at hand,306 whether the defendant
“purposely avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within 
the forum State,”307 an “estimate of the inconveniences” to the defendant
from trial in the forum,308 the interest of the forum in regulating the
defendant’s conduct and the location of witnesses,309 the burden on the
defendant, the interests of the forum state, the plaintiff’s interest in
 304. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). 
305. Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction To Adjudicate: 
A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966).  This article originated the term
“specific jurisdiction.” See id.
306. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945) (calling them “activities” 
and including the renting of property in the forum and employing forum residents as 
such). 
307. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
308. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d
139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 














   





   
 
  






   
 
         
obtaining relief,310 the “interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining 
the most efficient resolution of controversies[,] and the shared interest of
the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”311 
Courts currently do not consider the political rights of the defendant. 
This is puzzling.  Where the defendant used political rights in the forum to
specifically influence policies and procedures that relate to the suit, this 
amounts to strong evidence that the corporate defendant availed itself of 
the forum and purposefully acted in it, and that the defense of this suit
would not unduly inconvenience the defendant who has shown itself 
capable of financing and organizing lobbying activities in the forum. 
In contrast to the general jurisdiction analysis, the reconstructed specific
jurisdiction test does not probe for all kinds of political activities, but 
only activities that are directly and closely related to the suit at hand.  For
example, a corporation that lobbied for asbestos tort reform in a particular
forum should be more amendable to suit in that forum on an asbestos 
claim than a corporation that has not made use of its political rights with
regard to issues that relate to asbestos litigation.  This conclusion is
philosophically well-founded and practically meaningful. Use of political
rights is a kind of contact that, if sufficiently related to the suit, satisfies 
the minimal contacts threshold.312 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Current personal jurisdiction doctrine and scholarship are ambiguous 
and divided about what factors a court must or may consider before it 
can exercise jurisdiction over a defendant.  This is not surprising.  Without a
clearly articulated theory of political obligation that grounds questions of 
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction doctrine is bound to remain confused 
and unable to command moral respect.  It would be illegitimate for a state to
exercise jurisdiction over a person, artificial or real, that never had a
political obligation toward the state.  Political obligations are thus the key
for a coherent and normatively compelling doctrine of personal jurisdiction.
Grounding jurisdiction in political obligation allows us to judge in
each instance the legitimacy of a state exercising adjudicatory power over 
a defendant.  Political obligations also function as a measuring rod to test
310. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (“A court
must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the 
plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief.”). 
311. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
312. Where information on corporate political spending is not publicly available, 
federal and state presuit discovery might provide relief.  See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 27; 
Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 706–07 (1982).
For state rules, see, for example, ALA. R. CIV. P. 27, and TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1, 202.4. 
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whether persons have a moral obligation to obey the laws of a country and
to submit to its jurisdiction even when they desire to do otherwise. With
a viable theory of political obligation in place, it becomes possible to
explain and justify the state’s ability to exercise jurisdiction and the
subjects’ duty to respect that exercise of jurisdiction. 
Crucial to this assessment of political obligations is the availability of 
political rights and freedoms.  This is a factor that courts have long 
neglected to consider when determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction
over a corporation is proper.  Political obligation is not a binary variable. 
Instead, it functions on a continuum depending on the availability of
political rights.  As a result, the state’s authority to claim jurisdiction over
defendants similarly varies with the availability of political rights.  In
times as ours, when corporations enjoy more and more political rights, they
should become more amendable to jurisdiction.  In short, courts should
consider the political rights granted to and exercised by corporations when
making personal jurisdiction determinations.  Courts should be authorized
to exert more jurisdiction over corporations when they enjoy and exercise 
robust rights and less jurisdiction when they enjoy and utilize less robust 
rights.  
Grounding the doctrine of personal jurisdiction in a compelling normative 
framework clarifies the doctrine, strengthens its normative base, and
generates previously overlooked insights that can be used to expand the 
adjudicatory reach of courts over corporate wrongdoing. 
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